From the study of an economist close to President Medvedev, a view over Moscow's old Soviet academic quarter frames hulking Rubik-cubes of chipped concrete, sunk well into their decrepitude. Their neglected interiors are a maze of dim linoleum corridors, lined by dark wood panels and punctured brown leather sofas. Smokers light up in the lifts, rickety Urals-produced rust-packs with flimsy plastic floor-buttons. 

The economist is depressed: "Putin says he stands for stability, yet has no narrative to justify why he should return to the presidency. So he has become the stagnation candidate. Without deep reform the economy will slowly deteriorate into protracted stagnation and an atmosphere of disappointment." 

After suffering the worst recession of all the G20 countries in 2009, Russia began to lose the optimism of high-growth economies, known as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and instead contracted the pessimism of the West. In 2010 forest fires smothered the capital. The fumes of burning peat bogs obscured the Kremlin walls and made everything unclean. "They cannot even protect the rich," cursed the elite. Confidence in a Russian resurgence has since mutated into fear of stagnation: a term synonymous in Russia with the years of "the three funerals" that followed the oil-fuelled Brezhnev epoch and preceded perestroika. Putin's stunts are increasingly seen as PR cover-ups for state incapacity. Even the government admits that less than 20 per cent of orders are implemented on time. There is a constant need for "manual control" — personal inspection by ministers to ensure implementation.