Against this backdrop, William Hague has declared that he will run a "distinctively British foreign policy" but it is far from clear what this means. It seems unlikely that Tony Blair's Chicago doctrine of pre-emptive intervention, which guided New Labour's foreign policy, will continue. The month before assuming office, Hague highlighted Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear programme as the central concern he would face as Foreign Secretary. Once in office, he made it clear: "We've never ruled out military action in the future but we are not calling for it either." With the idea of pre-emption much less palatable in Westminster, the question remains whether a distinctively British foreign policy requires a distinctly British military. The defence review will have to decide what level of national autonomy in defence capabilities we wish to maintain, as opposed to merely maintaining the capability to make a contribution to coalition operations, which would seriously undermine Britain's international influence.

As the former Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind has noted, superpower status is currently reserved for the US, a club that will perhaps one day include China. However, Britain is one of a few countries that has a global foreign policy, coupled with either the economic power or military strength to advance it. Among our European neighbours only France, by virtue of its military strength, and Germany, through its economic might, share that role. The defence review is fundamentally about whether Britain wants to maintain a level of force projection to support the concomitant foreign policy clout.

In part, this is a question about the nature of the defence relationships we choose to pursue. Hague has promised a "strong but not slavish" relationship with the US and this would seem to suggest the continuation of the bilateral "special" relationship and strong ties to Nato, at the expense of Europe. But despite protestations to the contrary, the special relationship under President Obama does not seem as strong as it once was. As the US's strategic focus turns away from Europe, Washington has made clear its preference for Britain to play a leading role in the EU, not in support of an autonomous European defence force but to bolster European commitments to Nato.  However, neither Hague nor Defence Secretary Liam Fox is inclined to join EU-wide defence undertakings. Bilateral operations and perhaps joint equipment procurement with France seem more likely. 

There is a price to be paid for such muscular independence. 

Bilateral operations with the US or France would require a significantly more developed military capability than less onerous contributions to broader-based coalitions. Nonetheless, there are some areas of big-ticket expenditure where the UK could probably afford to reduce acquisition in line with scaled-back global reach. Most major powers with aircraft carrier capability make do with only one and the reduction of our carrier fleet from two to one ships would also allow a reduction in the F-35 jets operated from them.

A recent paper on the UK's defence budget by the Royal United Services Institute concluded that if numerical reductions can be "limited to 20 per cent or less...it would probably maintain the UK as Nato-Europe's largest naval power, albeit with an acceleration in its decline relative to powers such as China and India".  Such reasoning suggests that some level of multilateralism is necessary.