Obama exposed the Fordow facility in September 2009. In his own words, “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful programme”. When critics questioned his ability to stand his ground, after important initial concessions were made in the November 2013 interim deal, the president snapped back. At a policy conference in Washington DC, in December 2013, Obama said: “Now, in terms of specifics, we know that they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear programme. They certainly don’t need a heavy-water reactor at Arak in order to have a peaceful nuclear programme. They don’t need some of the advanced centrifuges that they currently possess in order to have a limited, peaceful nuclear programme.”

Iran would have none of that, however, and Obama blinked again. The announced deal merely seeks a temporary reconfiguration and downsizing of the two facilities. Once the deal restrictions expire in a decade, Iran will be able to revamp the two facilities as it pleases.

Verification was also critical for the Obama administration, especially in line with the president’s signature policy of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Given Iran’s history of nuclear lies and subterfuge, a lengthy and intrusive enforcement and verification mechanism was in order. But Iran has stonewalled again and Obama, so keen for an agreement, appears to have blinked. The announced deal merely stipulates that Iran will provisionally implement a verification regime its government already ratified 11 years ago. It will be up to Iran to maintain that commitment. And given that Iran had provisionally done the same under the 2004 Paris agreements, only to abruptly suspend such stricter monitoring arrangements when it chose to begin uranium enrichment, none of this is very promising.

That is especially true when one looks at the so-called Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s programme. The US insist they have overwhelming evidence that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons until recently. A deal that restores the confidence of the international community in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities needs first to address all Iran’s past suspicious activities. Yet Iran is no longer expected to show accountability until well past the agreement. Knowing what Iran did in the past is critical in order to verify its future compliance with the NPT. The Obama administration has instead agreed that a vague commitment to answer questions in the future will suffice. One more blink.

None of this is surprising. In the first major foreign policy speech of his presidency, Obama addressed the topic of nuclear disarmament before  a vast crowd of Czech citizens in Prague on April 5, 2009. Referring to Iran’s combined threat of nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, Obama said: “Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and our allies. The Czech Republic and Poland have been courageous in agreeing to host a defence against these missiles. As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defence system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defence construction in Europe will be removed.”

Six months later, Obama scrapped the missile defence commitment to the Czech Republic and Poland. And when, five years later, Iran refused to discuss its missile programme, he agreed to let it fall by the wayside of the negotiations. If you like your missiles, you can keep your missiles. Obama blinked, blinked, and blinked again. Why is anyone surprised that he continues to do so?