For the moment the US is the world's policeman because that is what the majority of countries want it to be. Many complain but they do not combine against it, not least because whatever they say they don't feel threatened. But policing is expensive, and the retirement of 78 million American baby boomers, among other strains, will mean fewer patrols and could leave the world a more turbulent place.
Eventually American global leadership will be forced to cede ground to increased international cooperation. Those who look forward to this shift towards a multi-polar world (Mandelbaum implies but doesn't say) should ask themselves how they would feel if decisions affecting their economic well-being or security were taken less by the US and Europe and more by the Bric countries, two of them harsh authoritarian regimes, the other two politically backward and grossly corrupt systems. Russia, whose energy wealth has helped sustain a kleptocracy in the Kremlin, and where the value of bribes rose from $33 billion when Putin came to power to $400 billion in 2008, is at risk of becoming a "giant, Slavic, Eurasian Saudi Arabia". Brazil too is appallingly corrupt and likely to squander any oil revenues that come its way. In India rotten infrastructure, lousy politics, poor education (75 per cent literacy against China's 92 per cent) and a too-small manufacturing sector seem likely to hold the country back, though the author sees scope for improvement, and under Modi we might get it. In China he sees a ruthless and efficient economic competitor.
Yet despite the financial meltdown the Brics have remained on the free market, globalist road they had previously chosen, and for all their problems each except Russia is likely to make a contribution to 21st-century global growth. And whereas international cooperation to protect the global economy will be erratic, prospects for the multilateral provision of economic services and other benefits, such as the decision by Germany, Japan and China to stimulate expansion, could be more promising. The greatest threat to jobs in the West of the open trading system he sees as coming not from Chinese toys or textiles but Indian offshore services. Migration too will continue to pose problems. Lifting all restrictions on immigration worldwide could yield $40 trillion, i.e. double the world's economic output. Conversely, resistance to immigration into Europe could limit its ability to offset population decline and drag down economic performance. On the euro his advice is simple and salutary: "Be careful what you wish for, you might get it." His conclusion is that a combination of the euro and manpower constraints could mean that Europe will grow slowly in coming years, if at all.
On America itself his judgments are succinct: "Moral hazard is present when the gains from economic activities are privatised but the losses are socialised," and capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell.
His final chapter maps out the fault lines ahead, but his conclusion is doggedly optimistic. The global economy, he writes, is to the Corn Laws version of 1848 what the modern automobile is to the late 19th century models. As is often the case with Mandelbaum's writing, the combination of realism and hope is energising.
Eventually American global leadership will be forced to cede ground to increased international cooperation. Those who look forward to this shift towards a multi-polar world (Mandelbaum implies but doesn't say) should ask themselves how they would feel if decisions affecting their economic well-being or security were taken less by the US and Europe and more by the Bric countries, two of them harsh authoritarian regimes, the other two politically backward and grossly corrupt systems. Russia, whose energy wealth has helped sustain a kleptocracy in the Kremlin, and where the value of bribes rose from $33 billion when Putin came to power to $400 billion in 2008, is at risk of becoming a "giant, Slavic, Eurasian Saudi Arabia". Brazil too is appallingly corrupt and likely to squander any oil revenues that come its way. In India rotten infrastructure, lousy politics, poor education (75 per cent literacy against China's 92 per cent) and a too-small manufacturing sector seem likely to hold the country back, though the author sees scope for improvement, and under Modi we might get it. In China he sees a ruthless and efficient economic competitor.
Yet despite the financial meltdown the Brics have remained on the free market, globalist road they had previously chosen, and for all their problems each except Russia is likely to make a contribution to 21st-century global growth. And whereas international cooperation to protect the global economy will be erratic, prospects for the multilateral provision of economic services and other benefits, such as the decision by Germany, Japan and China to stimulate expansion, could be more promising. The greatest threat to jobs in the West of the open trading system he sees as coming not from Chinese toys or textiles but Indian offshore services. Migration too will continue to pose problems. Lifting all restrictions on immigration worldwide could yield $40 trillion, i.e. double the world's economic output. Conversely, resistance to immigration into Europe could limit its ability to offset population decline and drag down economic performance. On the euro his advice is simple and salutary: "Be careful what you wish for, you might get it." His conclusion is that a combination of the euro and manpower constraints could mean that Europe will grow slowly in coming years, if at all.
On America itself his judgments are succinct: "Moral hazard is present when the gains from economic activities are privatised but the losses are socialised," and capitalism without bankruptcy is like Christianity without hell.
His final chapter maps out the fault lines ahead, but his conclusion is doggedly optimistic. The global economy, he writes, is to the Corn Laws version of 1848 what the modern automobile is to the late 19th century models. As is often the case with Mandelbaum's writing, the combination of realism and hope is energising.
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