The current occupiers had just those intentions in mind when they invaded Afghanistan but with nothing like the resolve or the understanding to see them through. Only a handful can manage more than a few words of Pashto or Dari. Con Coughlin discovered that to the Americans even recent history is obscure when he came across a briefing given by a US Marine officer for visiting diplomats in which it became clear that the speaker had no idea that the 1980s anti-Soviet Mujahideen had been America's allies.

Sometimes history has no lessons to teach but in the case of Afghanistan it has plenty. As both authors point out, the parallels between these two stories and current events are almost uncanny, with the same battlefields, the same tribes and — above all — the same outcomes making repeat appearances. In the 1839 invasion and in the pacifying operations undertaken by the Malakand Field Force 58 years later the British benefited from greater numbers and superior weaponry. These advantages were not enough to achieve a meaningful victory, as some soon recognised. The Afghans exhibited the same love of independence that the British liked to see in themselves. "I really believe that the people of Afghanistan will not give up their country without fighting for it," observed General Nott, shortly after arriving in the country. "I know I would not, were I in their situation." 

But for much of the time the prevailing view was that with one more thrashing, the clans would see sense and lie down. This was the opinion of the young Winston Churchill, whose bumptious progress through the North West Frontier is detailed in Coughlin's entertaining and enlightening book. Young Winston could be insufferable — conceited, brazenly self-seeking and, according to one who served with him, unable to "pass a mirror without inspecting himself or practising some speech or other". He was undoubtedly as brave as a lion, both physically  — as he proved on many occasions — and intellectually, in his willingness to admit the brutality of British methods. He was, of course, also wrong. Force alone was only of use to create conditions for parley, compromise and deal-making. It was this approach, designed by Lord Curzon, that would keep the frontier reasonably quiet in the new century.

A truly realpolitik approach might have halted America before it plunged into what will be judged as a pointless war, with the Taliban likely to return to at least a share of power once we have gone. One of the chief lessons of these books is that for an Afghan, all alliances are temporary. With a little more time, threats and inducements might well have persuaded the Taliban leader Mullah Omar to bring George Bush the head of his guest, Osama bin Laden. What a lot of trouble that would have saved.