Given this emphasis on the military and international dimensions of Napoleon's life, relatively little space is devoted to internal French affairs. This, it could be argued, has been covered by others. It also makes for less compelling reading. But given that Roberts wishes to talk up Napoleon as a bone fide intellectual, some attention to the way in which he set about silencing all hostile opinion, forcing many writers into foreign or internal exile, would have been welcome. So too would have been a fuller discussion of the many dimensions of the fostering of a culte impérial and the complicated etiquette of the luxurious royal court.
We do however catch a flavour of the mores of Napoleon's regime. The loathsome and duplicitous duo of Fouché and Talleyrand make their entrances and exits. Self-interested — and often mediocre — members of Napoleon's extended family enrich themselves in their newly-created kingdoms, rarely displaying either loyalty or gratitude. What remains of the old aristocracy is welcomed back. Hundreds, if not thousands, of new princes, dukes, barons and chevaliers are created. The Empress Joséphine's expenditure on clothes is exorbitant.
In contrast, and despite his many mistresses, Napoleon appears almost as a model of rectitude and abstemiousness. His tumultuous relationship with Joséphine de Beauharnais was undoubtedly one of both affection and passion. How one would love to know what the "zigzags" were that Joséphine reputedly performed in bed. But it was to his second wife, Marie-Louise of Austria, and their son, the King of Rome, that Napoleon displayed the greatest devotion. No sooner was he on Elba than Marie-Louise started an affair with the one-eyed Count von Neipperg. His son, who never saw his father again after Napoleon's first abdication, died of tuberculosis aged only 21.
But does Napoleon deserve to be called Great? As Roberts concedes, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars cost a total of around three million military and one million civilian deaths. Of these, 1.4 million were French. For this Napoleon must share much of the responsibility. Roberts also accepts that naval warfare was an almost total blind spot for Napoleon. Even after Trafalgar, he remained convinced that he could build a fleet capable of invading Britain, wasting men, money and material on a doomed enterprise. To this we might add Napoleon's abandonment of his army in Egypt, the abduction and execution of the Duc d'Enghien, the reintroduction of slavery in French colonies in 1802, catastrophic defeat in Russia, and other similar blemishes to his reputation. And, of course, Napoleon ultimately brought France to her knees.
We do however catch a flavour of the mores of Napoleon's regime. The loathsome and duplicitous duo of Fouché and Talleyrand make their entrances and exits. Self-interested — and often mediocre — members of Napoleon's extended family enrich themselves in their newly-created kingdoms, rarely displaying either loyalty or gratitude. What remains of the old aristocracy is welcomed back. Hundreds, if not thousands, of new princes, dukes, barons and chevaliers are created. The Empress Joséphine's expenditure on clothes is exorbitant.
In contrast, and despite his many mistresses, Napoleon appears almost as a model of rectitude and abstemiousness. His tumultuous relationship with Joséphine de Beauharnais was undoubtedly one of both affection and passion. How one would love to know what the "zigzags" were that Joséphine reputedly performed in bed. But it was to his second wife, Marie-Louise of Austria, and their son, the King of Rome, that Napoleon displayed the greatest devotion. No sooner was he on Elba than Marie-Louise started an affair with the one-eyed Count von Neipperg. His son, who never saw his father again after Napoleon's first abdication, died of tuberculosis aged only 21.
But does Napoleon deserve to be called Great? As Roberts concedes, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars cost a total of around three million military and one million civilian deaths. Of these, 1.4 million were French. For this Napoleon must share much of the responsibility. Roberts also accepts that naval warfare was an almost total blind spot for Napoleon. Even after Trafalgar, he remained convinced that he could build a fleet capable of invading Britain, wasting men, money and material on a doomed enterprise. To this we might add Napoleon's abandonment of his army in Egypt, the abduction and execution of the Duc d'Enghien, the reintroduction of slavery in French colonies in 1802, catastrophic defeat in Russia, and other similar blemishes to his reputation. And, of course, Napoleon ultimately brought France to her knees.
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