This I found the least convincing part of Müller's argument. It is difficult to see the Sixties student protests as anything more than what Raymond Aron described as a psychodrama in which, with copies of Marcuse and Mao in hand, self-indulgent youths played at revolution. Their subsequent evolution showed how superficial the rejection of the civilisation des frigidaires had been. By contrast, the revival of classical liberalism spearheaded by Hayek and Ludwig von Mises is not examined with the seriousness it deserves. Recognising that neoliberalism offered a "plausible" response to the crisis of governability witnessed in the 1970s, the attempt to frame a constitution of liberty is reduced to economic audits and the citizen as consumer claiming compensation if the trains do not run on time. If Michael Oakeshott receives due acknowledgment for his distinction between civil and enterprise 2 associations, as well as for his "unmatched" literary style, he makes only a brief appearance, more of the limelight being devoted to the once-fashionable situationalism of Guy Debord and the still-fashionable poststructuralism of Michel Foucault.
Nevertheless, Müller's central thesis that 20th-century political argument was crucially about contesting the meaning of democracy is sustained with great erudition and elegance. He makes brilliant use of some wonderful aphorisms, including Ernst Bloch's observation that Bolshevism was "the categorical imperative with a revolver". Above all, Müller provides an insightful and comprehensive overview of the development of political ideas in 20th-century Europe that takes in Fascism, Communism, social democracy, liberalism, and much else. Even the pluralism of the British Church historian J.N. Figgis receives a (welcome) mention.
If Müller has a conclusion, it is one that for the most part lies implicit within the story he tells. Communism might have been defeated, he argues, but the particular form of liberal democracy now existing falls short of the democratic ideals formulated in the course of the 20th century. Not only this, but the intellectual foundations of this political model have now been either eroded or forgotten. Most importantly, he suggests that a greater historical awareness of how we got where we are today might go some way towards "dispelling the comforting illusion that liberal democracy is necessarily the default position of Europe, or of the West more broadly".
Ultimately, Müller contends, democracy amounts to living in a condition of institutionalised uncertainty. And herein lies its greatest challenge for those prepared to embrace it. For the 20th century was littered with numerous political projects intent upon establishing the reign of permanent certainty. All ended in murderous tyranny. Yet many people still long for such certainty and many persist in clinging on to this ideal to the bitter end. Georg Lukács was one such. So was his fellow Hungarian Communist, the Soviet Republic's leader Béla Kun. As Müller recounts, when Kun was arrested by Stalin's secret police in 1937, his last words to his wife were: "Don't worry. Some mistake. I'll be home in half an hour." He wasn't.

















