Some contemporary critics argued that Schiller himself was caught in a relatively small circle of thoughts, including the idea of freedom. Even freedom, if thought and written about obsessively, could cause a writer to lose it. But they overlooked Schiller's radical departure from Hobbes's and Locke's state-centred concept. This still rings true in today's discussions on liberty, which range from John Rawls's conception of "political liberalism" as a basis for government without a comprehensive moral consensus, to Ronald Dworkin's view that liberty can only be secured by a constant interaction between politics and morality, with human dignity as the "sovereign virtue" in this complex relationship.

The obvious shortcoming in Schiller's concept of freedom was his reluctance to codify freedom in the shape of civil liberties that could be secured and, depending on the state system, guaranteed legally and politically. He remained convinced that "aesthetic education" paved the way to a genuinely civil society, for it made use of anthropological insights, such as Man's delight in "playing", in building up the fabric of social interaction. From Schiller's point of view, "playfulness" equipped humans to communicate with each other freely. 

Schiller's intention was, as far as one can tell, to support the cause of "continuous education" through an appreciation of art and the way in which art "works". He established a link between education and the artistic process by singling out in some of his other prose writings how a sense of the tragic or the sublime can be evoked. It was the freedom of (artistic) choice that mattered most to Schiller. Self-development suggested to him enabling oneself to make those choices that are within our reach, even though we should strive to attain ideals beyond our limitations. At the same time Schiller pointed, mainly in his plays, to the reality of unpredictable and inescapable fate, as well as the need to equip ourselves to cope with its impact. But he also showed us characters who are not free to emancipate themselves from their own natures. Wallenstein, for one, is "by nature" reluctant-his reluctance is, ultimately, the reason for his downfall. 

From today's point(s) of view the perceived downside in Schiller's concept of freedom is his lack of commitment to securing civil liberties politically and legally. At the same time, his notion of freedom shows considerable radicalism, if this word is to mean "going to the roots of matters". Schiller illustrated in his art how important it is to found a liberal society on the principle of education. We have to educate ourselves and each other, Schiller implies, in order to act responsibly but without forgetting what is innate in many, namely to strive to attain the unattainable. 

In turn, part of Schiller's anthropological realism was his recognition of fundamental "drives" or desires in Man. They were of a lesser physical denomination than Freud was to posit later, even though the subconscious and sexual drives are addressed in some of his plays, most importantly in Don Carlos. But the two main drives that Schiller identified in his theoretical writings are what he called the Stofftrieb and Formtrieb. They refer to Man's desire to accumulate matter, "stuff", substance, but also to the necessity to give shape to the amassed material. Again, the issue is how these drives relate to, or are compatible with, Schiller's concept of freedom. He did not suggest that we could, or should, attempt to emancipate ourselves from those urges. Freedom means that we make use of them "freely". We should "play" with them, for they should not govern or even overpower us. 

Schiller's concern about how we can preserve our freedom in the face of conflicting interests, external pressures and expectations was echoed some 200 years later when Heinrich Böll, the 1972 Nobel Prize winner for Literature, said in his last major interview: "Every day one segment of our liberties passes away." These concerns are today more relevant than ever. We need to be careful not to turn into captives of our ever-growing desire to increase self-protectionism. To live means to be exposed to risk. We can try to minimise it but we will never eliminate it. Fate and failure strike when we least expect them. We should remain free in the way we deal creatively with risk. The risk assessors and managers of today, who failed so blatantly prior to the recent credit crash, should read more Greek and Shakespearian tragedies, and a great deal of Schiller before they start assessing risks again. In short, we cannot afford ever to forget Schiller again, in this country or anywhere else.