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It is too soon to tell. One thing is sure, however, that it calls into question our dualist inheritance, and prompts us to consider the ways in which mind and matter form an integrated system in us, just as the fundamental physics of matter calls into question the distinction between the mind and the world around us. We have to wonder, then, what kind of cultural collapse, evolution or accommodation will take place in the face of the new science, especially as its technologies begin to redefine the parameters of our social, economic and medical lives. Will    dualists in years to come gather like smokers on the margins of our social spaces, indulging together their passion for illusion? If so, what will prompt change: human telepathic communication through enhancement of neural activity? Telekinetic control of our surroundings? Conscious computers? And what kind of change will it be: how will "integralists" think — culturally, socially and philosophically? How will we make sense of ourselves and others when we understand that we are materiality so complex, and so alive, that it becomes self-aware? We are optimistic that the new vision of human nature will help us to make better sense of at least three important areas of concern. 

First, it should help us to fathom our individuality and subjectivity. Our sense of our own uniqueness, of the key fact about my life that "I" and no one else has this particular perspective on this particular time and place, can appear antithetical to the "view from nowhere" to which science aspires. Alain Badiou has rightly lamented the loss of what he calls "the uncountable infinity constituted by a single human life" in this age of anonymity and digitisation. Yet biology and neuroscience have much to say about this irreducible particularity of the person, which is the source of so much that we value. Individuality and interiority are notable features of organisms generally, and the extraordinary complexity of our brain, with its thousand million million modifiable connections, is surely relevant to the subtleties of human variation. 

Second, we believe that the new paradigm will help us to understand how religions work, and how they can go wrong. These ancient traditions straddle the globe and deeply shape our contemporary world. Under a dualist view, it was difficult to make sense of religious practices and embedded beliefs since these are the product of earlier ages and integrated cosmologies which assumed a "porous" relationship between mind and body, self and world. Religions have so baffled and fascinated us because they were born "under different skies". Religions, like magic perhaps, have such a strong hold on our imaginations partly because they presuppose a participatory relationship between mind and world that dualistic science denies. The new scientific view of the human, which respects consciousness as an integral "feature of the world", is in fact surprisingly close to the metaphysical realism and theistic cosmologies of medieval Abrahamic religions, mutatis mutandis. Late medieval thinkers, such as Duns Scotus, anticipated many of the insights of the "embodied cognition" of our own age.  

Finally, the integrated view simply offers a more accurate description of what is going on in us as self-aware human beings than does the dualist one. Dualist philosophies were the natural and creative response to the rise of reductionist materialism, but they will always be limited in their critical power since dualism is based on incomplete science. The integrated view offers a more grounded account of what we are like as both body and mind, and so should help to illuminate our individual and, importantly, our social lives. The growing neuroscientific interest in the "second person", in how I and Thou (to use Martin Buber's terminology) communicate and interrelate, may offer real help in dealing with human conflict. How are community or family mediators, for instance, sometimes able to effect such rapid and lasting change in the face of deep-seated hostilities? Professional mediators "know how it is done" — they have an intuitive, implicit grasp of what to do. An integrated understanding of how body and mind combine in our social existence may offer a theoretical explanation of how this happens, which we can "port" from one context to another. This opens up the intriguing possibility that we can learn from our own best practice in one area and then recreate it in a wholly different context, such as the present encounter between China and the West. Indeed, this approach is showing promise. Chinese identity presupposes a particular way of managing social difference, based on harmony and assimilation, while Western identity has a contrasting tradition, based on confrontation followed by reconciliation and peace-building. Each identity manages social difference differently. A more broadly based understanding, working with the neurobiology of primary human social cognition, may allow us helpfully to reconcile these contrasting approaches in a new species-wide account of how we can best manage and positively adjust to difference.

Will the conception of human nature that will succeed the porous and the buffered views contribute to human wellbeing? We hope and believe so. After a period of "neuromania", a "neurophobic" scepticism about the relevance of neuroscience to understanding human nature is becoming fashionable. We believe this is misplaced. There is no need to defend mind against matter in this way. The absorbing challenge is to understand their manifest and mysterious integration, and then to apply this new self-understanding. We believe that it will help us to humanise our rapidly globalising world.

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AnonymousAshu
February 20th, 2014
11:02 AM
[The new scientific view of the human, which respects consciousness as an integral "feature of the world", is in fact surprisingly close to the metaphysical realism and theistic cosmologies of medieval Abrahamic religions, mutatis mutandis. Late medieval thinkers, such as Duns Scotus, anticipated many of the insights of the "embodied cognition" of our own age.] This reflects a really shocking unawareness of Indian philosophy, whose conception of consciousness as a universal element makes the much later speculations you mention look hopelessly primitive by comparison.

Saksin
September 30th, 2013
10:09 AM
Jake: A appreciate your comment. To be conscious is to see, hear, feel, or otherwise experience things. That capacity must, according to Tononi, exist in the metabolic networks of our body on account of their respectable measure of "integrated information" (and he is quite explicit about this implication of his theory in his 2008 "Provisional manifesto"). Since that capacity does not make any difference to the functioning of those metabolic networks, why would nature equip them with it? Presumably nature equipped them with a high measure of integrated information for reasons other than to make them conscious. It does after all lend them efficiency, and that does make a functional difference. I suspect that the same is true for the neural networks of the brain that are structured for high information integration. Which would mean that the reason some neural networks equip us with consciousness, and how they need to be structured in order to do so, still remains to be accounted for. There too I suspect that nature went to the trouble of equipping us with them in order to make a functional difference, which also seems to be the case. How well would we function without the capacity to see, hear, feel or otherwise experience things?

Cristero
September 27th, 2013
3:09 PM
This is just another nasty lesson of closed minded matherialism/nihilism/atheism.

M.G. Piety
September 26th, 2013
9:09 PM
This is a lovely article. It would not seem possible, however, to talk about an "integration" of mind and world without retaining some kind of mind-body/world dualism. If you don't have two substances, after all, then there is nothing to be integrated.

hariks
September 26th, 2013
8:09 PM
My god to you has no mercy, since god's kidneys flow and dribble through quarantine

Tedd
September 26th, 2013
8:09 PM
"I see 'mind' as the word that refers to 'ideas'; all one's ideas constitute one's mind--and that's all she wrote." I have no problem with that, so far as it goes. But what, then, are ideas? It seems to me that you're attempting to avoid the difficulty of explaining mental experience by merely denying that there's anything to explain.

Jake
September 26th, 2013
5:09 PM
Saksin, Why do you assume that consciousness must 'make a difference' to the workings of the neural/biochemical networks that give rise to it? I agree that Tononi's integrated information theory does not really come close to Abrahamic cosmologies, various anticipated insights by sporadic medieval thinkers notwithstanding, I think that's an overstatement on the authors' part, I don't believe Tononi himself would make that claim. His theory, as I understand it, does, however, allow for the possibility of consciousness showing up in networks constructed of basically anything, i.e. computers could in theory be built with the requisite network structure and dynamics to be conscious. The authors' throw an undeserved bone to the Abrahamic religions. Tononi would point out that those structures are not in fact instantiated basically anywhere besides brains, and reject 'flirtation with' the Abrahamic faiths and probably describe pan-psychism as theoretically possible but not in fact the case at this time. My point is, the author's overreach does not invalidate Tononi's theory, nor does his theory's implication that consciousness arises from but does not then interact with neural (or other) networks.

Saksin
September 26th, 2013
11:09 AM
When a theory of consciousness (Tononi's) ends up having to attribute consciousness to the biochemical metabolic networks of our body (which score respectably on measures of "integrated information") this would seem to be good grounds for concluding that the theory is wrong (given that such presumptive consciousness could make no difference in the workings of metabolic pathways - perfectly explained by the physical structures and kinetics involved - and therefore would be both unobservable and non-functional). Instead Zeman and Davies (in agreement with Tononi) conclude "that all of nature has a – sometimes – hidden potential for mentality." The need to thus flirt with pan-psychism is simply a symptom of not having solved the puzzle of how neural structures actually generate conscious experience. But attributing consciousness to non-neural nature allows the authors to see a kinship between their kind of neuroscience and "the metaphysical realism and theistic cosmologies of medieval Abrahamic religions" (where a kinship with pantheism would seem far less far-fetched). Are we really to believe that the conceptual structure of neuroscience, presumably one of the natural sciences, somehow accomodates the almighty personal creator god of Middle Eastern monotheism? This is but one example of the kind of facile analogizing by which the authors buttress their hope for a neuroscience-based new conception of human nature. Such a conception will no doubt ripen once neuroscience actually comes to understand how the brain works (which means delivering the coherent and comprehensive kind of systems neuroscience for which gaudy scan images do no more than pose questions). When that day comes there will be no need for the kind of premature syncretism promoted by Zeman and Davies.

FrankLepave
September 25th, 2013
9:09 PM
Can you prove the opening statement about humans being the only self reflecting species.

Jon Jermey
September 25th, 2013
9:09 AM
"Under a dualist view, it was difficult to make sense of religious practices and embedded beliefs..' It has never been difficult to make sense of religion, under any view. The mental comfort to be obtained by believing that oneself and the people one loves will live forever, the relief from anxiety and frustration delivered by the belief that justice will prevail and the wicked will be punished -- these are plain and obvious benefits, quite strong enough to motivate people to hold them, and to encourage others to hold them, in order to shout down the nasty sceptics insisting that they may not be true. IF religious beliefs were true, then yes, some major rearrangement of our world view would be necessary were they to be disconfirmed; but as they are not, the one we have will continue to do nicely.

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