Time, though, never stands still. Sometimes it just goes backwards. There are discussions about displaying an earlier monument — the original one. This was raised by the Austrian authorities on June 28, 1917 at the entrance to the bridge — a large, sombre stone construct, consisting of stout pillars and a pietà. It was soon taken down, in 1918. But the material was too valuable to destroy. The central bronze medallion, depicting Franz Ferdinand and Sophie, is in good condition and stored in the cellars of the National Museum. These memorabilia have wider significance.

The effort is still made, particularly on the European Left, to place a liberal gloss on the bloody act of June 28. That effort is misplaced. One can speculate on what the rather naïve young men who lined up to kill the archduke thought they were going to achieve. Their accounts are detailed but ambiguous. But their controllers understood perfectly well. The object was the overthrow of Austrian power in favour of a Greater Serbia.

The politicians in Belgrade did not themselves plan or authorise it. Not even the Austrians suggested they had. Nikola Pašić, the Serbian prime minister, incompetently and unspecifically tipped off the Austrian authorities beforehand, but the latter, even more incompetently, ignored the tip. Nevertheless, the assassination was made in Serbia. It was planned by the "Black Hand" which, in the person of "Apis", Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, coincided at this juncture with Serbian military intelligence.

Apis had form. He and his fellow conspirator officers were behind the gory despatch of the Obrenović dynasty in 1903 in favour of the restored Karadjordjevićs — the Obrenović having proved too pliant towards Austria.

Apis was by 1914 persona non grata to Nikola Pašić, because he was out of control. That is why he was executed on trumped-up charges three years later. But in 1914 it was Apis's agents who directed, trained and armed the gang of assassins. Most importantly, the whole Serbian state apparatus, within which — then and since — one must include prominent intellectuals and key elements in the Serbian Orthodox Church, was fully behind the broader strategy of "liberating" the South Slavs to include them within what amounted to a Greater Serbia (by whatever name). In that regard, the Austrian authorities were fully justified in blaming Serbia.

Viewed from the angle of Belgrade — rather than perspectives more familiar in London, Paris, or even Berlin — the conflict that began in 1914 was a Third Balkan War. The First Balkan War (1912) against the Ottoman Empire saw Serbia gain control of Kosovo, while the Second (1913) against Bulgaria saw it gain much of Macedonia. These two wars left the Serbs as the most powerful Balkan state. They also fed the violent, aggressive aspects of a deep-rooted and enduring Greater Serbian ideology. Belgrade began to feel strong enough, with Russian support, to take on its larger Austrian neighbour. And, especially since the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, Serbian state policy regarded Vienna as the principal obstacle to its ambitions.