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No, Hoffmann's problem is "the right of individual petition, which enables the court to intervene in the details and nuances of the domestic laws of member states". He would be perfectly happy with a court that merely criticised member states for human rights breaches, without putting them under any obligation to remedy those breaches. Failing that, he would extend the "margin of appreciation" - a poorly-translated French concept under which states are allowed some latitude or discretion in administering their own laws, particularly on issues of sexual morality.

Removing the state's obligation to change its laws in line with Strasbourg rulings would reduce the court's influence over the emerging democracies of Europe to almost zero. And it is not a requirement that troubles most governments unduly. Five years after the court first declared that Britain's blanket ban on allowing sentenced prisoners to vote breached the right to free elections, there is no sign of any change in the law.

But Hoffmann is on stronger ground in asking the Strasbourg judges to extend the margin of appreciation. To some extent, they do so already: ruling on a challenge by the radical Muslim cleric Abu Qatada and other detainees in February, the European Court showed great deference to the law lords' famous "Belmarsh" ruling in December 2004.

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