Lieven does not neglect any of these areas. He explains how the political and social structures of the Russian empire differed fundamentally from those of the rest of Europe and the bearing this had on the unique nature of the Russian army — whose command structures, tactics and weaponry he describes in authoritative detail. He is very sound on the diplomatic background, demonstrating how the differences of opinion, personal feelings and occasional bloody-mindedness of the principal actors impacted on allied policy and crippled strategy. He does not neglect to mention the profound suspicion with which most Russians viewed their British ally, with its global ambitions, and how such seemingly irrelevant geopolitical considerations affected military operations on the Continent. His sure grasp of the strategic situation and vivid depiction of the gruelling conditions that faced the Russian soldier bring those operations to life. But it is in the area of finance and logistics that he excels, demonstrating graphically how Russia's ability to absorb France's might and then mobilise vast resources made her proof against any military brilliance on the part of Napoleon or anyone else.
Lieven devotes much attention to how the war was financed by Russia and above all how its human, animal and vegetable resources were marshalled for the cause. He takes us step by step through the process by which men were procured for the army, how they were uniformed, armed and trained, how they were marched nearly 2,000 kilometres to the Polish border and then across Europe.
He does not spare us the personal misery involved and the huge social costs for villages the length and breadth of Russia. The men had to be fed and this was the greatest challenge facing the Russians in 1813-14. As Lieven explains, "More than half a million Russian soldiers served outside the empire's borders in 1813-14, and this in a Europe where only two cities had populations of more than 500,000." The only means of supplying them with rations was horsepower and enormous effort was put into providing this vital element without which the army could neither eat nor move.
The horse was also a vital piece of operational equipment, and it was the Russians' ability to corral vast numbers of mounts and train peasants to use and care for them that gave the allies the overwhelming superiority in cavalry over Napoleon that undermined his strategy and made his defeat inevitable. So while he accords huge credit to the Russian quartermaster Georg Kankrin and the many lesser figures along the logistical chain, Lieven concludes that, "In many ways, the greatest hero of the Russian war effort in 1812-14 was not a human being but the horse."
