In one sense there should be nothing surprising about a book like this. Many of the insights that Karsh presents have appeared elsewhere in his own earlier writings and in the work of other scholars such as Fred Halliday, to whom the book is dedicated.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that as with his previous works Karsh will be further excoriated by his academic critics on the Left. Indeed, the politicisation of the subject matter partly explains why Karsh overstates his case. With the exception of the Iranian revolution, it is dubious to suggest that the tail actually wagged the dog. It is hard to argue that regional states had a determinative effect on great power politics, as the title would suggest.
Equally, Karsh does not place enough emphasis on the effect of external interventions on the region. For instance, Obama’s overhasty retreat and failure to provide the much-needed diplomatic surge was critical to the failure of the nascent Iraqi state and the rise of ISIS.
To an extent Karsh commits the same error as his “New Historian” antagonists such as Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé. They are ultimately engaged in an interpretive war over a similar, limited collection of sources. Going against the trend in diplomatic history, none of them pay enough attention to Arab and Iranian sources and this has left Karsh to make deductions from Western material. As a result, the book is unlikely to settle many historical disputes. It is best seen as a polemical riposte to Obama’s Cairo speech, which was intended to reset America’s relations with the Middle East. Obama suggested that “Muslim majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations.” Karsh attempts to counter Obama’s limited view of Middle Eastern history, not only by bringing out regional power politics but also the history of Islamist imperial ambitions.
Karsh explains much of the logic behind Obama’s recent nuclear deal with Iran, which can only really be understood as part of Obama’s wider regional ambition for US disengagement. The President’s approach gives Iran a free hand to make unprecedented strategic gains, supposedly bringing order to the region by creating what is actually a dangerous balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In light of Obama’s folly, it is very hard to doubt the broad sweep of Karsh’s
thesis.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that as with his previous works Karsh will be further excoriated by his academic critics on the Left. Indeed, the politicisation of the subject matter partly explains why Karsh overstates his case. With the exception of the Iranian revolution, it is dubious to suggest that the tail actually wagged the dog. It is hard to argue that regional states had a determinative effect on great power politics, as the title would suggest.
Equally, Karsh does not place enough emphasis on the effect of external interventions on the region. For instance, Obama’s overhasty retreat and failure to provide the much-needed diplomatic surge was critical to the failure of the nascent Iraqi state and the rise of ISIS.
To an extent Karsh commits the same error as his “New Historian” antagonists such as Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé. They are ultimately engaged in an interpretive war over a similar, limited collection of sources. Going against the trend in diplomatic history, none of them pay enough attention to Arab and Iranian sources and this has left Karsh to make deductions from Western material. As a result, the book is unlikely to settle many historical disputes. It is best seen as a polemical riposte to Obama’s Cairo speech, which was intended to reset America’s relations with the Middle East. Obama suggested that “Muslim majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations.” Karsh attempts to counter Obama’s limited view of Middle Eastern history, not only by bringing out regional power politics but also the history of Islamist imperial ambitions.
Karsh explains much of the logic behind Obama’s recent nuclear deal with Iran, which can only really be understood as part of Obama’s wider regional ambition for US disengagement. The President’s approach gives Iran a free hand to make unprecedented strategic gains, supposedly bringing order to the region by creating what is actually a dangerous balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In light of Obama’s folly, it is very hard to doubt the broad sweep of Karsh’s
thesis.
Like this article? Share, save or print using the icons below:
