Life under military occupation meant two tiers of existence — huge villas by the sea for the Israeli settlers; cramped, decrepit dwellings inland for the Palestinians. This was one of many reasons why so many rejoiced so wholeheartedly when the Israeli withdrawal, directed by prime minister Ariel Sharon, began in August 2005. But for Dr Jabir, the main concern was what had been left behind: the greenhouses which he was hoping to use in order to jump-start the Palestinian economy and propel it into a new age of prosperity.

American Jewish donors paid the Israeli settlers $14 million to leave the 400 hectares of greenhouses. At first, Jabir planned to keep them running, providing employment for up to 4,000 workers. There were further plans to  turn PEDC into “a sort of equity fund for local start-ups”, with hopes of having “$1 billion invested within five years”, the Economist reported enthusiastically at the time.

Three months after the withdrawal, work was in full swing and the situation looked promising. Damage to the greenhouses inflicted by both departing settlers and Palestinian looters had been repaired, and in November 2005 Gazan farmers were preparing for their first harvest — $20 million worth of cherry tomatoes, peppers and strawberries. Even US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was given a bag of Gazan bell peppers for her birthday that month.

“I think we have made this a success in a very short period,” Jabir told the New York Times. “I think we surprised even ourselves by how quickly we reached this stage . . . We are employing thousands of people in these greenhouses. We kept the growing cycle intact. We have pumped a lot of money into the Gaza economy.”

Within just another three months, however, this rosy picture turned bleak. Businessmen hit a brick wall in the form of the sudden closure of the Karni crossing, then the only passage for Gazan produce into Israel and beyond to lucrative foreign markets.

The Karni crossing had been targeted by terrorists in the past — an attack by Palestinian militants in January 2005 killed six Israelis and injured five. Condoleezza Rice personally negotiated for this and other crossings to be opened. Yet, despite there having been no attacks on the crossing since August 2005, and just as the initial harvests stood in lorries waiting to be exported, Karni was kept almost continuously closed between January and March 2006. Losses translated into missed salaries. In February 2006, when guards still awaiting their pay abandoned their posts, Palestinian looters attacked Jabir’s greenhouses and caused a further $1 million of damage. The following month, demonstrators took to the streets demanding salaries or the resignation of the Palestinian government.

Whether because of security threats from the Palestinians or a lack of Israeli goodwill following Hamas’s electoral victory that January, the crossing’s closure meant a viable export industry stood no chance. The $20 million invested by PEDC in the project was swiftly evaporating — long before Hamas violently ousted Fatah from Gaza in the summer of 2007 and assumed overall control of the strip. “We have buyers around the world,” Jabir told the BBC in March 2006. “Everyone is interested in buying our produce. But we can’t get it out of Gaza. On a daily basis we are losing $120,000.”