David Loyn's new book, Butcher and Bolt, is an account of foreign engagement in Afghanistan from the first appearance of a British diplomatic mission there in 1809 up to the present day. To tell the story, he draws not only from the established works of the Afghan historical canon but also on extensive personal knowledge of the country garnered as a BBC correspondent. This contrast between the use of historical material and on-the-ground experience lends an especial vividness to the sections of individual reminiscence. Particularly powerful are Loyn's accounts of meetings with the Taliban hierarchy, and his harrowing eye-witness descriptions of murder, rape and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Afghans against Afghans in the 1993 battle for Kabul after the fall of the Communist government. However, more important than his depictions of these individual incidents is his percipient analysis of the trends in foreign intervention in the country, and his comparisons between the earlier conflicts and that of today.
As the British Empire began to reach into north-western India in the early 19th century, the British began to worry, like their Mughal predecessors, about defending the frontier with Asia. Fearing that Russia might punch its way through Afghanistan to attack the Indian possessions, they thought it best to set up a puppet king in Kabul to prevent Russian influence from spreading south. They refused to make an easy deal with the paramount Afghan ruler of the time, Dost Mohammed, and were carried away with false intelligence that their own candidate, Shah Shuja, would be well received if Dost Mohammed were deposed.
The British invaded Afghanistan in 1838, and were easily able to put their man on the throne. However, he was received sullenly, and unable to command any authority. The British forces were unable to leave, but instead were sucked into an unplanned and expensive long-term occupation. They had not thought carefully about the form of government that should be adopted, how Afghanistan should be run, nor had they carefully considered the military and logistical requirements of the occupation. They were unable to rely on the Afghan government apparatus, riddled with corruption and veniality. They found it impossible to set up any viable army from the Afghan population. As discontent with the occupation spread, the British found themselves harassed by guerrilla attacks which closed the roads and made transport difficult. And yet, they complacently deceived themselves that the country was, in the words of one official "wondrous quiet from Dan to Beersheba." The discontent ultimately exploded in a dramatic uprising in Kabul in the winter of 1841, leading to the destruction of the occupying force of 16,000 British and Indian soldiers and camp followers.
