Many commentators have already picked up on the obvious similarities between this conflict, the First Afghan War, and the present day. President Karzai has already been nicknamed "Shah Shuja" after the unfortunate British puppet ruler. However, Loyn's analysis goes far beyond these surface parallels. His account has been much influenced by a hugely important but much neglected source, the writings of Mohan Lal, the Indian secretary of a British envoy to Kabul, Sir Alexander Burnes. Lal, being a native and speaker of the Afghan languages, had a unique perspective of the effects of the British occupation on Kabul between 1838 and 1841. He was one of the only observers to see directly how British failures to recompense loyal service from Afghans led to their defection and hostility. He could see, as the British could not, the frustration amongst the Afghans about the lack of clarity as to who was genuinely in power, the Afghans or the occupying forces, and the consequent sense of humiliation; the sense of fury and injured pride over the haughty behaviour of British forces in Kabul; and also practical problems caused by the occupation, such as soaring inflation and terrible shortages of food.
Today, as then, Kabul has been ravaged by inflation, shortages and soaring property prices. People are discontented with the conduct of foreign troops and contractors, whether indiscriminately killing civilians or clogging up the city's roads with their convoys. A proliferation of moneyed NGOs, sucking up much of the aid to the country with little in the way of visible results or improvements in living conditions has led to a sense of broken promises. Their function as a rival to the Afghan government has fed a feeling of paralysis and humiliation. Talented English-speaking Afghans are used for menial tasks by the NGOs and foreign organisations, preventing the government from employing the best people and building up its own capacity. On top of this, foreign governments seem intent on ignoring the sheer complexity of the problems, and pretending that all is well with the present strategy. It is a potent mixture, and one that we ignore at our peril.
Loyn's narrative covers a great deal of ground - the three Anglo-Afghan wars, the drawing of Afghanistan's controversial frontiers, the border disputes in the tribal areas with modern-day Pakistan, the Soviet invasion, the attempt by Pakistan using the Taliban to establish Afghanistan as a defensive hinterland like the British before them - elegantly and succinctly. He has a journalist's talent for telling a good story, and with his work he has succeeded in describing this notoriously complex period of Afghan history with perfect clarity. He does not shy away from uncomfortable truths, for example debunking the oft-repeated canard that Afghanistan had no tradition of suicide attacks before the present conflict. Suicidal fanatics were certainly an element of the war in 1838, although I would hesitate to describe them as "Islamists" or "Wahhabis," attributing to them a political agenda which I do not believe they would have possessed at that period of the 19th century. Despite this minor quibble, Loyn's book makes an excellent and gripping introduction to this vital time in Afghan history.
