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Friedman's Fancy
September 2016

So, when Friedman returned from his 1968 fantasy economy to the real world of lending and borrowing, and of commercial banks and a central bank (the world of his 1963 article, as well as of dozens of others), not once did he recommend the helicopter drop. Media prattle about helicopter money and the constant referencing to Friedman are just a lot of silliness. Friedman was entirely conventional, thinking in terms of purchases of securities by the central bank as the archetypical monetary policy action.

Last month the Bank of England announced a package of monetary policy measures to avert a supposed Brexit-related recession. Most observers accepted that, because the Bank’s policy rate was already down to 0.5 per cent, the further reduction to 0.25 per cent could hardly make much difference to the economy. The interesting part of the announcement was that the Bank intends to expand its “quantitative easing” programme. It plans to purchase £60 billion more gilt-edged securities and, in a new departure, £10 billion of corporate bonds. QE matters because it increases the quantity of money. What would Milton Friedman make of the Bank’s operation?

We need to check whether money growth has been too slow, too fast or about right in the recent past. The last set of money numbers showed that in the year to June the UK’s quantity of money (labelled M4x in the data) went up by 5.8 per cent, the highest figure since 2008. Further, money growth has accelerated in the last few months. On this basis, the extra £70 billion of asset purchases — which will add over 3 per cent to the quantity of money — is unnecessary. The case for such a large stimulus depends heavily on the forecasts of a Brexit recession, and the forecasts may be wrong. Friedman’s signature prescription was not helicopter money, but stable growth of the quantity of money. Money growth of 4 or 5 per cent a year is about right for the UK in the long run; an annual rate of money growth in the high single digits would be excessive and take risks with inflation.
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Postkey
September 27th, 2016
8:09 AM
" . . . an annual rate of money growth in the high single digits would be excessive and take risks with inflation." “Thank you for posting a reply, M.. Again, however, I’m afraid I don’t see a direct answer to my question. I asked what mechanism in the real world the Fed has available to raise money supply above money demand (something that you said above is necessary if inflation is to occur). Money supply can rise if the Fed buys assets or if loans are made from available reserves. To my way of thinking, neither of these can occur without the full and conscious participation of the other side of the transaction. Hence, the supply of money cannot be increased in the absence of demand. Yet you say (above) that inflation only occurs when money supply is in excess of money demand. You have defended this with analogies, but not with real-world examples of the underlying process. I am a huge fan of using analogies to get the essential idea across; however, unless these mirror something that is going on in the real world (and in a very real and tangible sense), then recommending policies based on such stories is dangerous to say the least. I hope you don’t think I’m being rude, but I think this is a key question and one that I have never found a monetarist able to answer: how is it in the real world that the central bank raises money supply above money demand? Can you please tell me this and in the context of actual Federal reserve policy tools? This is not a trivial question. The entire monetarist superstructure rests on it. If the answer is that in reality this cannot happen, then I’m not sure how the rest of the monetarist analysis survives.” "Supplying money is like supplying haircuts: you can’t do it unless a corresponding demand exists." http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey/2011/05/14/money-growth-does-not...

Postkey
September 27th, 2016
8:09 AM
"However, any sensible reader of the 1968 article can see — or ought to be able to see — that Friedman was joking." Joking? It's taken 48 years to finally conclude that Friedman's influential {and damaging} 'recondite 1968 academic paper' paper is nonsense?

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