In the days following the assassination in 2005 of the Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, it seemed that for the first time in over 30 years since Syrian troops had occupied Lebanon, there was a chance to rescue Lebanon from Syria's stranglehold. The murder triggered an unprecedented popular reaction - it was nicknamed the Cedar Revolution and forced Syria finally to acquiesce to UN Security Council resolutions demanding Damascus withdraw its troops.

With Syrian fingerprints all over the charred remains of Hariri and his party, it seemed safe to assume that Damascus's mischief would finally be treated for what it was. And for a time, so it seemed.

A special UN investigation was launched and a tribunal was set up to try and punish the culprits. Diplomatic isolation followed quickly - even the European Union, traditionally a champion of dialogue, felt its association agreement with Syria had to be put on hold.

To realise that Syria deserved the cold shoulder did not require the life of a prime minister. Despite repeated efforts by Europe and the United States to engage Syria constructively, the man at the helm has been misbehaving since he inherited power upon his father's death in June 2000. Many hoped that Bashar al-Assad would be a Young Turk for Syria - a hope that rested on the vacuous assumption that, having studied in the West, Assad would bring Syria out of its insular and repressive ways.