Supporters of the deal dismiss alarm at some of the concessions they made because, they claim, the economic leverage of sanctions against the Iranian economy is retained thanks to a “snap-back” mechanism: were the Iranians to cheat, sanctions could be swiftly reinstated.

There are three reasons why this is little more than a soundbite. First, sanctions do not snap back. It took several years to build political support and diplomatic consensus for international sanctions to yield the desired effect. Iran will now have ample time to rebuild its shattered economy and devise antidotes to potential future sanctions. If Iran were to cheat on the deal, they would be able to build a bomb within a year, according to the deal’s supporters themselves. It would take longer for Iran to feel sanctions pain again. Second, a snap-back would trigger an Iranian walk-out. If sanctions are reimposed, Tehran will no longer consider itself bound by the deal. But it is not as if such a turn of events would restore the balance of forces before the deal was signed. Iran’s economy would be vastly improved and provisions allowing Tehran to continue nuclear research and development with Western cooperation would put Iranian scientists in a much better position than today. In eight years’ time, they can even apply for PhDs in the United States. Third, the snap-back mechanism is not straightforward — it requires going through a debate among the six powers, Iran and the European Union about whether there is a violation and whether it warrants reimposing sanctions. Expect pressure from the business community and the diplomats invested in the success of the deal to downplay any but the most egregious violations.

This leaves us the hope, candidly expressed by US and European dignitaries, that the deal can strengthen Iran’s moderates. In reality, the deal removes the arms embargo against Iran in five years and missile programme restrictions in eight. It rehabilitates all Iranian sanctions evaders. It delists all those Iranian entities that engaged in money-laundering over the years to circumvent sanctions. It promises eventually to remove all Revolutionary Guard entities and leaders from EU sanctions. It immediately lifts all restrictions on the Supreme Leader’s business empire. And it cancels all restrictions on business in those areas where the Revolutionary Guards and other hardliners excel. How is this going to benefit the moderates?

It is hard to argue that this is a good deal, unless, of course, one takes Tehran’s side — in which case, this is the best outcome Iran could have hoped for.