The clash with Israel, which Erdogan gradually escalated, went hand-in-hand with thriving bilateral relations in both the civil and military sectors. Bilateral trade grew by 135 per cent from 2002, when Erdogan's party won power, to 2010, when the Mavi Marmara incident occurred. This allowed him to cite thriving business and military ties with Israel to fend off critics who accused him of whitewashing Hamas's record as a terror organisation devoted to an Islamic fundamentalist political platform. But in truth, the progressive deterioration in relations with Jerusalem served Erdogan's ambitions to establish himself as a champion of Arab and Islamic causes and shop for alliances beyond Turkey's Western horizon. When Turkey cancelled an annual aerial exercise that included Israeli jets, it initiated a new one, this time with a squadron of Chinese jets which stopped in Tehran for refuelling.

Now, with regional turmoil toppling or challenging those dictators who fought hardest against the Muslim Brotherhood (Erdogan's Arab ideological next-of-kin), the prime minister senses an opportunity. He wants to assert his country's leadership further by propping up Islamic forces that are emerging on top in the post-revolutionary uncertainty of the Arab Spring and establishing the AKP as their sponsor, patron and guide. What better way to do that than by pandering to the worst instincts of regional politics — by bashing Israel?