But what exactly is liberal conservatism? We can only begin to answer that by identifying where it comes from. Although Tory is another word one rarely hears spoken by Cameroons, the most obvious precedent for the liberal conservatism of today is the liberal Toryism of the 1820s. Lord Liverpool’s government, which ran from 1812 to 1827, was said to be divided between traditionalist Tories – often called ‘ultras’ – and a loose collection of individuals in the cabinet, later called ‘liberal Tories’, who leaned towards more progressive views, particularly on trade and foreign policy.

When one hears references to liberal conservative heritage in foreign policy, it is the figure of George Canning – foreign secretary from 1822 and briefly Prime Minister, before his death in August in 1827 – who looms the largest. On the international stage, Canningite is presumed to mean a number of things: hard-headed in the pursuit of the British national interest; liberal in sentiments; and circumspect in actions but morally consistent in conduct. A moral realist, if you will.

Nonetheless, it would be mistaken to assume that Canning laid down a clear set of foreign policy principles, or had a coherent theory of international relations. To be sure, he had instincts and guiding principles, such as a preference for constitutional governments over autocracies. But what is often assumed to be Canningite foreign policy was forged in response to the vagaries of realpolitik rather than some grand design. As foreign secretary, he was constantly forced to refine and readjust his existing position to changing threats, not least that arising from Tsarist Russia.

After the battle of Waterloo, the consensus position of British foreign policy was ‘non-intervention’ in the affairs of other states. This was an approach that Canning wilfully inherited from Lord Castlereagh, his much maligned predecessor, with whom he fought a duel in 1809. If anything, he was able to sidestep criticism from the Whig opposition more effectively than Castlereagh, because he was even more staunchly anti-interventionist. With some justification, Henry Kissinger once compared the makers of British foreign policy after Waterloo to American isolationists. There was clearly a strategic rationale behind the policy of non-intervention; Britain trained its sights on extending its empire and had no territorial designs on the European continent.