His own gift for rational philosophical argument was unquestionably prodigious. His philosophical acuity was extraordinary, as was his ability to demolish other people's ideas effectively and mercilessly — as I discovered when he supervised my thesis. Like many other exceptionally intelligent people, he was easily bored, and he often reacted to what he found boring with contempt, a reaction he found it particularly difficult to suppress when confronted by ideas he thought shallow, superficial or silly — as I also discovered. But when he was engaged by something, he was a fascinating conversationalist and a wonderful teacher.
His intelligence wasn't only used for destructive purposes: he could be creatively critical. Still, what he is probably remembered best for now is his capacity for taking apart philosophical ideas and showing how they were incoherent, or unsupported, or incredible. That talent is on spectacular display in this always engrossing, and frequently scintillating, collection of his essays and reviews.
There is, for instance, a delightful review of Robert Nozick's Philosophical Explanations. Williams recognises Nozick's analytical and logical brilliance. He castigates him for "trying to do a dreadful thing: to lead philosophy back to the aspiration to be edifying". He says that Nozick's attempts at edification end up sounding like a commercial for breakfast cereal.
One of the themes that winds its way through many of the essays republished here (and they cover his writings from the age of 30 until just before his death) is his scepticism about the possibility of providing an objective foundation for ethics and morality. In a review of Iris Murdoch's The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists, he criticises Murdoch for accepting Plato's doctrine that "reality and goodness must after all be one", and says it means that "her most eloquent writing is in the cause of a world view which we and she must know is an illusion."
His scepticism became more marked, and more thoroughly worked out, the older he got. Several of the reviews in this book focus on what he saw as the essential contrast between science and ethics. Science could turn out to be what it seems to be, an objective account of the world that we come to know and discover because that account is true. But ethics cannot have an objective foundation: our ethical beliefs cannot be explained as the result of our coming to believe objective moral truths.
Two reviews of books by the pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty take up that theme. They are wonderfully effective in showing the incoherence of Rorty's idea that we should give up on the idea of scientific truth. Rorty claims that scientists who insist that they are discovering "what is really out there" are mistaken. He argues that the correct philosophy shows they shouldn't say such things, because it shows that there is no "out there": there are only the different vocabularies we have for telling stories, of which physics is only one, and one which can no more tell the truth about "objective reality" than can poetry or literary criticism.


















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