Williams responds with a very pragmatic point. He notes most scientists believe that their work, if successful, will discover objective truths about the world. Moreover, having such a belief is an important part of their ability to continue to do scientific research: if they thought they were merely telling stories in the manner of poets or literary critics, they wouldn't be able to practise science in the way they do. So as a pragmatist — which Rorty claims to be — Rorty should endorse and accept scientists' own description of the sort of activity they are engaged in.
More fundamentally, in order to assert that scientists cannot possibly discover objective truths, Rorty has to occupy the transcendental position that his own philosophy says is not there to be occupied. As Frank Ramsey memorably said about Wittgenstein: "What you can't say, you can't say — and you can't whistle it either."
Williams' insistence that it is possible that science achieves objective truths about the world implicitly raises the question: what about ethics? Can we know objective ethical truths? Two reviews of books by Thomas Nagel in this volume explore that issue. Nagel is convinced of the objectivity of ethics. Indeed, he is convinced that even those who say they are sceptical about the objectivity of ethics are deluding themselves: really, they are committed to believing that there are objective ethical truths.
Williams patiently and clearly explains why and how he thinks Nagel is mistaken. He says that Nagel cannot account for the evident fact that, throughout most of human history, human beings have not accepted the moral beliefs that Nagel thinks are the only correct ones."If Liberalism is correct", Williams asks, "and is based in universal human reason, as Nagel seemingly takes it to be, why is it that earlier times did not think of it or accept it?" Nagel, he says "lacks a ‘theory of error' for what he calls moral correctness".
Williams thinks there is a simple reason for this: there can't be such a theory, because there is nothing of which moral beliefs can be true. The only explanation of why we think what we do about ethics is one which looks to our particular, contingent history and how it has shaped our thought. That history cannot show our ethical beliefs are true — although it may help to vindicate them by showing that having such beliefs makes it possible for us to live together successfully.
That, in essence, is why "philosophy needs history", and it is the title of one of the most interesting essays in this book. But it begs one very basic question: what are the consequences of there not being any objective ethical truths? One of them may be that there cannot be any objectively true history. Even if objective historical truths can be established without ethical ones, history won't be much help in resolving political and moral conflicts when our ideological inheritance comprises several different and incompatible systems of ethical belief.


















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