Obama came into office with three foreign policy objectives, which fell short of the coherence of an actual strategy. First, he repeatedly tied domestic economic renewal to national security. Second, he was determined to wind down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, he was sensitive to America's global standing, which had reached a nadir, due to the unpopularity of those two wars. As Obama's deputy national security adviser for strategic communications Ben Rhodes put it to the New Yorker, "If you were to boil it all down to a bumper sticker, it's ‘Wind down these two wars, re-establish American standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities, from Asia and the global economy to a nuclear nonproliferation regime."

This effectively marked an inward turn: the role of securing global order was no longer America's burden but was to be shared with other countries, rivals and allies alike. As his then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, it would be a "multipartner" world. Hence, the Obama administration pursued a "Reset" of relations with Russia and there was talk of the US-China strategic and economic dialogue becoming a "G2". These policies were vague and aspirational. Obama failed to appreciate that increasing American soft power wouldn't accomplish as much as he hoped without being backed by a tangible willingness to use hard power or a clear set of objectives.

Perhaps the nearest that Obama has come to a grand strategy is the so-called "Pivot to Asia". The effective bargain between Beijing and Washington on America's military dominance in the region, cemented by Richard Nixon's meeting with Mao in 1972, has now given way to resurgent Chinese ambition. Despite the realities of stagnating economic growth, China's newfound power has translated into a desire to protect its commercial shipping routes in the Yellow, East China and South China Seas. Recognising the growing importance of maritime trade routes in the region, the Obama administration initiated a shift in strategic priority. The aim was to bolster US defence commitments to allies in the region and specifically increase US naval presence. The Pentagon announced that it would focus 60 per cent of its fleet and airforce in the region, as well as starting to train marines in Australia. The Pivot now looks to have been counterproductive and a strategic error, given events in the Middle East and Europe.

The Pivot was based on a misreading of the tough rhetoric from Beijing's leadership, born of insecurity. Contrary to US understanding, it was an attempt to harness nationalist fervour in the face of massive US military superiority as well as domestic economic and social tensions. Beijing has recently announced that it would increase its military spending by 12.2 per cent in 2014 to $131.6 billion, representing an almost unbroken string of double-digit annual increases over the past two decades. Although intelligence sources suggest this is well short of the actual Chinese military spend, ultimately this represents less than a third of the US military budget earmarked for 2015.

However, the nature of Chinese military spending suggests that the Pivot has been counterproductive and has destabilised the region. China's navy has invested in "area deniability", with the specific aim of hampering US naval forces in the region. The implicit logic is that the Chinese navy wants to deny the US the ability to operate throughout much of the Pacific. To follow the logic to its political conclusion, China wants to weaken US alliances with South Korea, the Philippines and Japan. Through its naval power, China essentially wishes to dictate the regional balance of power.