Although far from certain, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (the "Ikhwan") probably did not instigate the demonstrations, and may well have been caught off guard like so many others.  But the Brotherhood, although legally banned in Egypt for decades and living in a shadow world politically, was nonetheless a major factor in what happened next. It remains well-organised, tightly disciplined, and clear in its Islamicist agenda.  On the first Friday after the demonstrations began, the Ikhwan's mullahs used the Friday prayers to call its followers into the streets, substantially increasing both the size of the demonstrations and their intensity.  

The Brotherhood had already been active in the scheduled September presidential elections, moving close to a formal endorsement of el-Baradei's candidacy, a seemingly odd coalition between a collection of medieval, theocratic radicals and, in effect, a European social democrat. Nonetheless, the alliance served both parties, giving the Ikhwan entrée to the Western media and a role in opposition to Mubarak.  Even before the demonstrations began, el-Baradei had announced support for the Hamas autocracy in the Gaza Strip and for ending all sanctions against Hamas:  "Open the borders, end the blockade!" he told Der Spiegel last July. Since Hamas is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Brotherhood, this was a critical point. Ending Egypt's blockade of its border with Gaza (the little-known and sporadically effective counterpart to Israel's blockade) would allow free transit between Gaza and Egypt, thereby facilitating the transfer of operatives, weapons and finance from Hamas's major backer: Iran.

As the days passed in Egypt, the Obama Administration went through a public agony of confused, contradictory, and inconsistent responses.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opened the public torrent of words by observing that Mubarak's government was stable, and Vice-President Biden chimed in that it was not a dictatorship.  Within days, however, President Obama himself was telling Mubarak privately and publicly that the "transition" to democracy had to begin "now", enabling his press avatars to leak furiously that Mubarak must resign immediately. Within less than a week, the White House endorsed Mubarak remaining in office until the end of his term in September, a line replaced just days later by renewed insistence on Mubarak's immediate departure from office.

This foolish, endless public commentary was an all-too transparent effort to stay on top of the news cycle, and to portray the US President as directing events rather than merely responding to them. As a consequence, Obama's credibility was undercut everywhere.  By trying to please everyone, he ended up pleasing no one. The truly important communications, entirely off the media's radar, were between the Pentagon and Egypt's military, urging restraint while also trying to understand the shifting dynamics on Egypt's streets and behind closed doors, where the key political negotiations were taking place. Unfortunately, Obama's public twisting and turnings have obscured the important, beneficial impact of these invisible lines of communication between Washington and Cairo.