Moving beyond Europe, there are a host of issues where Obama's foreign policy may make it easy to mask distance and problems between London and Washington. Continuing US withdrawal from Iraq along the previously agreed schedule without regard to political or strategic stability within the country, withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in summer 2011, as Obama promised in his West Point speech last year announcing Nato's increased efforts there, and weakness in dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons programme are all issues where Cameron will probably feel very comfortable with Obama's declinist view. The real risk is that, to avoid the "poodle" comparison, Cameron will be arguing publicly for weaker policies than Obama, thus giving Obama ample cover as he retreats and withdraws. These are precisely the issues where Margaret Thatcher would be telling Obama not to go all wobbly, and that is exactly what conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic need Cameron to do until Washington can resume its traditional centre-right posture. 

There is simply no reasonably foreseeable answer about what Cameron will do, based on the existing evidence, not least of all because he has no governance experience. Politicking and campaigning is altogether different from governing, as the Obama example demonstrates, unsettlingly. The pressure of real decision-making, as opposed to the posturing of campaigns and debates, shapes and matures different politicians differently, and Cameron has not been in the kiln before. 

His first governing responsibility, trying to form his own government, has already drawn mixed reviews to say the least, both within and without the Conservative Party. There are basically three outcomes to political negotiations, whether international or domestic: a good deal, a bad deal, or no deal. To those concerned primarily with substantive policy, the "bad deal" alternative is usually the worst outcome. To those concerned with power and process, the "no deal" alternative is almost always the worst outcome. Unfortunately, the post-May 6 negotiations have, probably for the first time, publicly revealed the real Cameron.

In sporting terms, Cameron made a number of "unforced errors", mistakes that were purely his own responsibility, not caused by smooth-talking Lib Dems. He looked too hungry for a deal. His own negotiators said publicly and from the outset that they rejected the possibility of going it alone, and forming a minority government. He gave away too many prime Cabinet seats. Worst of all, having drawn a red line against compromising on Lib Dem demands to move towards proportional representation, Cameron compromised, perhaps starting a long, slow suicide for his own party. None of these are comforting auguries for strength on foreign policy in the months ahead. Weakness is never pretty. A bad deal is not necessarily irreparable, but some of this deal's defects seem inherent in Cameron's political DNA. 

In more normal circumstances, Cameron should welcome new elections quickly, and quietly radiate confidence that his incumbency, popular goodwill for a new PM, and perhaps a few early victories, would propel him to a clear majority in the Commons. Unfortunately, his agreement with Clegg almost certainly precludes such a strategy, as do repeated statements about "strong and stable" government. Agreeing to a fixed-term Parliament and, even worse, having five Lib Dems in the Cabinet only further demonstrate Cameron's aversion to going back to the country soon. If, however, contrary to appearances, Cameron is quietly aiming for a swift second election, few doubt that politics will dominate everything, even in national security. Neither scenario bodes well for a vigorous, active Britain in foreign affairs.