There are more than 150,000 former mujahideen, waiting on the sidelines to see which way the wind blows. The Taliban never directly controlled the whole of Afghanistan and do not have enough popular support to govern the country. Between 1995 and 2001, they spread their rule, often nominal, by bribing the mujahideen. According to a proverb, one cannot buy an Afghan but one can always hire him. The policy of shunning the former mujahideen, branding their leaders "warlords", may sound chic among the bien pensant, but it doesn't work in real life.

There are also more than 50,000 armed, private "security professionals" who, provided they are deployed in the context of a broader strategy, could be used more effectively. 

The new Afghan army and police force has about 180,000 recruits. Often, these men draw salaries but spend their time doing crosswords or, at best, directing the traffic in Kabul. According to experts, a third of the new Afghan army is reliable and competent. Embedding them with Nato forces could give them a role in taking the war to the insurgents. Under existing plans, it would take until the end of 2013 to build up the new army's strength to 300,000 — the benchmark that experts regard as necessary. 

The drug-smuggling rings have 15,000 armed men who often co-operate with the Taliban, whose own strength may be about 20,000. Smaller insurgent groups, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb Islami (Islamic Party) may command a further 5,000 armed men. Hekmatyar, who worked for the CIA for years, recently made it clear that he was open to offers.

In a hierarchy of operations, the Taliban is the top target. This could mean making tactical alliances even with some unsavoury groups and buying others.

While some pro-Obama editorialists are already contemplating defeat in Afghanistan, the Taliban and other insurgent groups are sending quite different signals. Last month, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the reclusive Taliban leader presumed to be hiding near the Pakistani city of Quetta, issued an end of Ramadan message in which he all but admitted that things were not going well for his movement and its terrorist allies. For the first time in eight years, the mullah also indicated his readiness to consider negotiations as a means of ending the insurgency.