The number of Nato troops now in Afghanistan — just under 100,000 — is twice as large as in 2004. At the same time, the new Afghan army has more than doubled in size. And, yet, insurgent attacks have increased dramatically while many previously safe provinces have moved into the "insecure" column.

The reason behind this paradox is Nato's "as if" strategy. After the initial victories of 2001-2002 that ended Taliban rule, Nato troops have been behaving "as if" they were fighting, but in most cases they are not. Now in self-defence mode, they have extended their presence beyond the greater Kabul but limit themselves to patrolling main roads and tracts of territory regarded as "sensitive". In Afghanistan, there is very little of the "search and destroy" or "hunt and kill" operations that proved so successful in Iraq.

The same "as if" attitude pervades the multiple development plans launched since 2002. In most cases, the net outcome of a project is the illegal enrichment of a few dozen influential individuals, often linked to the new ruling elite in Kabul. Visitors to Kabul, and a few other cities such as Mazar Sharif and Taleqan, would be struck by the new luxury villas, some with Olympic-size swimming pools, fleets of shining German and Japanese cars and chic boutiques offering contraband luxury goods for the nouveaux riches. One of the former mujahideen commanders, Abdul-Rasul Sayyaf, now owns more real estate than his group ever controlled during the war of liberation against the Soviets. 

By the time corrupt officials and Western consultants, accountants, insurance brokers and security companies have received their respective cuts from a budget allocated to a project, little is left to carry out the project itself.

Afghanistan's new democracy also suffers from this "as if" approach. August's presidential and provincial elections were conducted as if held in a genuine democracy. However, the huge number of stuffed ballot boxes and the surrealistic numbers announced for Karzai show that we are faced with an exercise in make-believe.

The actual government of the country is also based on "as if" and make-believe. An astonishing percentage of high officials have dual nationality, and hold foreign passports. Many maintain their main homes abroad, in Europe, the US and the Gulf states, where their families live. Typically, a high official spends almost half a year outside Afghanistan, for "family reasons".

The new Afghan Army, too, is an "as if" force. Since there is no banking system in the country, most recruits are unable to send part of their salaries to their families in remote towns and villages. As a result, they save the salaries of four or six months and then simply desert, returning home where they can live on their savings for years. Most Kabulis explain that the root cause of this "as if" situation is the belief that the Americans and their allies do not have the desire or the stamina to remain committed to Afghanistan.