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TC: Now Robert, I'm going to cause you a problem: I want quotes for that, please.

RS: No you can't — that is just a debating point. 

TC: It's quite important, because I've read Keynes, and you're not right.

RS: I am right. There were two elements in Keynes. What he thought was that you could offset, up to a point, a collapse in the demand for loans by increasing the supply of money. And by collapse in the demand for loans he simply meant that when confidence fell, liquidity preference increased, and you could try and fight the increase in liquidity preference by flooding the banking system with money. But the basic cause of the collapse of the money supply was a collapse in the demand for loans, and you can follow that in his chapters on long-term expectations, and on the rate of interest. 

And here's another quote — you asked for a quote, and you supplied the quote yourself, let me read you your quote. You say: "If there is some tendency to a measure of long-run uniformity in the state of liquidity preference" — an important proviso — "there may well be some sort of rough relationship between the national income and the quantity of money, taken as a mean over periods of pessimism and optimism together." 

That is a long-run relationship, and it depends on an assumption that liquidity preference stays the same. And that assumption is not in Keynes, it's not in the General Theory, it just isn't. 

TC: It's certainly true that Keynes claimed that problems in the economy arise because of instability in the demand to hold money balances. That is certainly part of his theory. Empirically, he's wrong.

RS: He's not wrong. How do you explain today? Although there's been substantial quantitative easing, the actual growth in the demand for loans has been small, and in fact, I quoted you these figures already: net lending in July fell in the UK at its fastest pace since records began in 1993. 

TC: Look, bank deposits and bank loans are totally different things.

RS: Doesn't matter, I know that. It's the demand for loans that's important.

TC: Oh no, it's not.

RS: : Oh yes it is, of course it is. You can make credit facilities available, it's the spending that matters.

TC: Let's get this absolutely straight in terms of definitions. Liquidity preference is the demand to hold money balances. Is that correct or not?

RS: Liquidity preference is the demand to hold money balances, yes. And that can fluctuate.

TC: And national income is determined by the interaction between the quantity of money created by the banking system, which does indeed depend partly upon loans to the private sector, and the demand to hold money. But money can be created by the state if it borrows from the banks. Bank lending to the private sector is not necessary at all.  

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Ralph Mugrave
October 23rd, 2010
12:10 PM
In your flax economy you say that printing money destroys “the value of the participants' cash balances”. So how come the monetary base of the U.S. increased by an astronomic and unprecedented amount 18 months ago, yet inflation is currently at record lows? As distinct from the above evidence, and moving on to the INTENTION behind money printing, the intention or objective is to bring sufficient extra demand to bring full employment, but not so much as to cause excess inflation. Also in your flax economy you make the very unrealistic assumption that there is only one final product, namely clothing, and that the market for this is saturated. But let’s run with that assumption. An economy where there are no consumers who want any more goods or services is an economy where there is no unemployment. That is there is no one who wants to work extra hours so as to consume more. No Keynsian with any common sense would advocate money printing (or any other method of increasing demand) in these circumstances.

Richard Allan
March 30th, 2010
12:03 AM
I'm an economics graduate from the LSE, and I don't understand why this article concentrates on those parts of "macroeconomics" which we only teach to first-year students, and abandon in embarassment by the end of even a three-year Bachelor's degree. The ideas being discussed in this article have absolutely no currency with the economists that I've known. The idea that printing money, or increasing consumption, can somehow increase wealth is ludicrous. Anyone constructing a theoretical economy in his head should be able to see this for himself. Printing money will discourage people from holding cash balances; this will INCREASE instability in the economy by leaving people more vulnerable to liquidity demands. Increasing consumption can only destroy accumulated wealth all the faster. Let's say we have an economy where one worker grows food, another flax, and a third weaves flax into linen. They each "hoard" cash in expectation of future spending requirements. Now suddenly the demand for linen and therefore flax drops off; perhaps the market for clothing has become saturated. What's the commonsense response? Telling the two textile workers to find new jobs. But this would cause "excess capacity" in the economy (the land would have to be ploughed under before it could grow anything else, and the sewing machines are worthless) and "unemployment", which Keynesians can't allow. So what's their solution? Print money, destroying the value of the participants' cash balances, and use it to "stimulate the demand" for textiles, presumably by buying the stuff up and burning it (as we all know occurred during the New Deal). This allows the textile workers to keep their jobs! But what happens to savers? Well, either they have to shrug their shoulders and eliminate their "real savings", leaving them vulnerable to "liquidity shocks" (like a sudden bout of illness rendering them unable to work), or they switch their cash savings for, well, REAL savings; ie. stored food. But assuming the economy is producing the maximum amount of food possible (at least until the flax land is repurposed, which we've decided to prevent for the sake of the textile industry), increasing the amount of "hoarded" food is surely worse for food consumption than any amount of "hoarded" cash. At least someone was eating the damn stuff beforehand! So if the farmer decides to stop saving, and is then laid low by illness, there will be a very sudden "panic" in the economy as textile workers scramble for food production. But if workers replace their cash savings with food savings, inflation won't work any more! You can't print food with which to buy clothes; and since the farmer doesn't want to trade food for clothes (he has enough already), and doesn't want to hold cash (loses its value too quickly), we'll end up with the textile industry collapsing either way! The only difference is that in the meantime, we forced people to make an undesired switch from cash savings to either "no savings" (more volatility in the economy as a result of unpredictable expenditures) or "real savings" (reducing the supply of real goods for consumption). The "fiscal" alternative is a similar Devil's bargain. Either take the farmer's food in taxes now, or borrow food from him, promising to tax him later to pay back his own debt (Ricardian Equivalence shows that these two are exactly similar in terms of effects). If the taxes cause him to scale back his production of food, then you've reduced real wealth in the economy. But if they don't, then surely the taxable proceeds would be better invested somewhere else than in a failing line of business? The same can be said if inflation somehow doesn't cause anyone to alter his cash balances; the concept of opportunity cost means that wasting money (and goods!) by putting them to bad use is just as bad as destroying them. The only way that printing money can increase wealth is if there is genuinely idle capital in the economy which could be devoted to the production of real value (ie. happiness), but for whatever reason, is not. However, the only plausible mechanism by which this capital could be put to work by printing money is if wages are "sticky downwards", so the workers are effectively refusing to work for a utility-maximising wage. But firstly, printing money to force down their real wages was a stupid idea in Keynes's time (where index-linked wage contracts were already becoming commonplace) and is an even more stupid idea nowadays. It will just not have the desired effect. And secondly, if workers refuse to work for a utility-maximising wage, this must be regarded as a voluntary decision on their part; and as a believer in the Harm Principle, I don't believe it's the government's role to reverse voluntary decisions (or "indecisions"). And thirdly, I find it far more likely that diverting any funds to government will be used to reward unproductive special interests than to match genuine demand with genuine excess capacity. In conclusion, I find that this entire article is based on a vision of economics that is (i) out of favour with the economics establishment, (ii) easily disprovable by thought-experiment to anyone capable of consecutive thought, and (iii) a mere attempt to justify government intervention in the economy for its own sake, and for the sake of increasing the "mystique" surrounding economics in order to justify an increase in economists' salaries. The fact that it has attracted no comments thus far is evidence that it has been treated by the readers with the confusion and indifference that it deserves; I simply couldn't allow it to go unchallenged myself.

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