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Ahead of the Nato summit in Wales in September, both sides of the transatlantic divide need to reappraise Nato's fundamental strategic purpose. While the European project has become dominated by a technocratic obsession with monetary union, increasing the sense of inequality among its members, Nato's purpose and funding have been allowed to drift for far too long. It is ironic that Nato is currently the most effective organ of European cooperation, precisely because it has not sought to impose a federal grand bargain on its European members. Nonetheless, the Atlantic Alliance needs to be reinvigorated and its strategic purpose reconfigured in order to safeguard the postwar stability of the continent.

While Europe's political leaders attempt to envisage reform that will answer domestic dissatisfaction with the EU, they must not waver from the task of articulating collective security through Nato. The twin pressures of domestic frustration with a largely economically focused European Union and the challenge to the borders of democracy from Russia should force Nato to return to its founding purpose — the defence of continental Europe and ideals of free trade and democracy.

Due to historic mistrust of the US, France in particular has long believed that the EU needed to assert its independence from Nato, which it ultimately regards as a tool of American foreign policy. So the line of reasoning goes: without an independent European defence force, there can be no independent European foreign policy. These sentiments, though longstanding, have found significant recent support in the Front National.  

Such reasoning has been a continuous tension in Nato. By 1966 President de Gaulle completed France's gradual withdrawal from Nato's command structure and it did not fully rejoin until 2009. It is unsurprising that since the  late 1990s France has been at the forefront of trying to develop a distinct EU military capability. The process of defining such a capability has been extremely limited, in part due to American insistence that EU capabilities should be, in Madeline Albright's words, "separable but not separate" from Nato. In practice, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy has limited itself to the so-called Petersburg Tasks, primarily concerned with humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and crisis management. Nato has effectively remained the sole guarantor of continental European defence.

Europe is in a sense a victim of its own success. Relative political stability means that the EU and Nato have succeeded in keeping peace between member states, to the extent that it seems out of the question that a member state could once again pose a military threat to the others. In other words, war as an instrument of politics has become de facto and de jure unthinkable. This seems to have also translated into Nato's European domestic security considerations, such that Nato has spent much of the last decade more concerned with "out of area" operations. Where territorial defence has been pursued, it has largely been concerned with the hugely contentious issue of ballistic missile defence, one of the causes of  acrimony with Russia.

The idea of autonomous EU defence seems to have broken down and in practice promise and policy have never kept in step. The first key pillar was supposed to be that a community with a common currency could not leave defence solely in the hands of individual nations. The second pillar was that in times of austerity European nations might be more willing to spend money on their defence rather than on transatlantic undertakings. Given the uneven and now seemingly unpopular level of European integration, the logic behind autonomous European defence is starting to crumble. The European elections, far from undermining Nato, in fact show the need for collective security to be bolstered outside the auspices of the EU.
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Max
July 14th, 2014
3:07 PM
This summer will be remembered for the flow of lies and stupid articles.

Vlad
July 14th, 2014
9:07 AM
This man really believes in true democracy. When I read, I thought it was a woman over 50. Too naive and idealized.And what kind of aggression it? Crimea territory which for over 200 years is Russia. And more than 200 years, there are Russian troops. Most of the people there, all these 200 years were Russian. When it is in a part of Ukraine, all the past 23 years, they are perceived as a misunderstanding.Therefore, after the illegal political coup organized by U.S. taxpayers' money in order to bring to power a pro-American government, people are simply people in the Crimea did not recognize him and declared independence. Whether they supported Russia? Yes. As well as the United States in a similar situation would have supported.And funny to remember about the fact that the referendum is not unconstitutional government which came to power through unconstitutional. Constitution or valid or not. No middle ground. At the time of the referendum, the constitution has already been deposed.

Halappa
July 14th, 2014
6:07 AM
The only aggressors in the modern world - NATO and USA.

Baron
July 13th, 2014
1:07 AM
Spot on, Mr. James.

Lawrence James
July 9th, 2014
11:07 AM
Alexander Woolfson’s strident bugle call for intervention in the Ukraine and the Crimea combines a misunderstanding of history with discordant echoes of music-hall Russophobia. His speculation about whether Nato could somehow have mobilised forces for dispatch to the Crimea invokes that jingo chorus of 1854: “Let’s raise a mighty cheer,/We’re going to the Crimea,/We’ll tame the Russian bear.’ Having abjectly failed to ‘tame’ the equivalent beasts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we should know better. As for the context of recent events in the Ukraine, Woolfson disregards Russia’s historic experience and misunderstands Nato’s purpose. The alliance was the product of the Cold War created solely to resist Soviet encroachments on Western Europe and not to make land grabs across the borders of the former Russian empire. Wisely, it did not take advantage of the implosion of the Communist state in the 1990s and repeat the Allied intervention during the Russian civil war of 1918 to 1920. Yet, something along the lines of this catastrophic enterprise is now being contemplated as a solution to the Ukrainian crisis by overheated champions of Nato engagement in what has always been accepted as a Russian sphere of influence. Russia has made it plain that she regards the former Czarist and Soviet province of the Ukraine as a de facto province. There are valid historic reasons for this. The French invasions of 1812 and the German of 1918 and 1940 taught Russians that their land mass was the best means of defence. Since the eighteenth century the Ukraine has been a vital part of this vast glacis. Russia is also nervously aware that on the two latter occasions a substantial number of Ukrainians defected to the invaders. Likewise, Russia has a legitimate claim to the Crimea, as strong, say, as the United States has to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and its sundry Pacific island naval and air bases. If a section of the population of any one of these outposts chose to spurn their patrons and attach themselves to their rivals, gunboats or their modern counterparts would soon be in action. Their use would be justified by the same arguments as Russia has deployed over the Crimea. Post-Cold War geo-strategy has seen a reversion to traditional assumptions and methods. We live, as we did in 1914, in a world of official and unofficial empires and spheres of influence. This being so, there is an excellent historic case for the Ukraine staying within the orbit of Russia and the Crimea returning to Russian sovereignty. Acceptance of a status quo upheld by history is infinitely preferable to a policy of shifty intrigues with malcontent Ukrainians and sending absurdly tiny detachments of Nato soldiers to camp out in the forests and marshes of Lithuania.

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