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Putin has achieved his aim of destabilising Ukraine to the point that its membership of Nato or the EU is unrealistic in the mid-term and he now controls the strategically important Crimean port of Sevastapol. Beyond these goals, and even once tensions recede, he has ushered in a new chapter in transatlantic security and it has been imposed upon, not directed by, the Nato allies. The European settlement is under threat from inside and out, and Putin has managed to drive a wedge between the European and American allies over how best to manage the situation or meet future security requirements.

It is ten years since the "big bang" of EU enlargement absorbed much of the former Soviet Union and talk of the future scope of the union seemed to defy geography. With a quick, skilful assault on the contours of European democracy and Nato's credibility, Putin has reversed the post-Cold War success of Nato and the EU in extending membership to whomever met their democratic and economic requirements. It is no coincidence that one of the few unifying issues among the extremist parties at the European polls has been their anti-American stance and pro-Putin links. The Kremlin will no doubt welcome their destabilising presence in the European parliament.

A week after his West Point speech, Obama's sop to the terrified and most at risk eastern European members of Nato was the announcement of a "European reassurance initiative" (ERI). The package sounded more impressive than his previous lacklustre efforts at European security. However, as use of the word "reassurance" rather than "deterrence" signals, Obama's real impulse was less about securing Europe and more about a short-term pacifier for America's noisy Nato partners. The reality is that extra troop rotations and naval patrols in Europe of the magnitude announced will not make a significant strategic difference to European security. Unsurprisingly, Obama's announcement made intra-Nato politics worse. The Western European allies were concerned about jeopardising business links with Moscow, while the eastern allies, the Poles in particular, complained that the efforts did not go far enough to protect them. Indeed, Poland has asked for a Nato deployment of 10,000 men on its soil.

Obama and the northern European allies seem to think the crisis will blow over and it will soon be a return to business as usual. So while the President looks to his European partners to increase their share of the burden, Nato continues to act as if the full US military is behind it. In reality, the US military is undergoing its biggest decrease in man power since the Second World War. The worrying outcome of this mutual US-European evasion of responsibility is not the loss of Franco-Russo naval contracts or German natural gas imports, which currently impede a unified European response to Russia, but that smaller eastern European Nato members will look to bolster their security through non-Nato channels. This would lead to heightened security tensions and the spread of political instability on the continent.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have seen it reject the 1997 Nato-Russia Founding Act, which formalised post-Cold War borders. Failure by America to act decisively and let an under-resourced mid-level power undertake low-cost revisionism on Nato's doorstep has not only heightened the security stakes in Europe but also set a dangerous global precedent. Coupled with Obama's stated desire for burden-sharing with regional allies, it is having undesirable and counterproductive strategic consequences.

The message has already been absorbed in Asia. Shinzo Abe's Japan has undertaken an unprecedented move from a historically limited defence force to an offer to support regional allies against China. Abe has simultaneously stoked nationalist rhetoric, prodding the Chinese dragon. The outcome of grooming nationalist-inspired regional hegemons is not hard to envisage. This is fertile ground for regional arms races, into which America would be dragged via treaty obligations. Of equal concern is that Ukraine voluntarily denuclearised on the basis that it would receive territorial guarantees from major powers. The fate of Ukraine might lead other powers in a similar position to develop a nuclear deterrent or seek alliances with alternatives to the US.
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Max
July 14th, 2014
2:07 PM
This summer will be remembered for the flow of lies and stupid articles.

Vlad
July 14th, 2014
8:07 AM
This man really believes in true democracy. When I read, I thought it was a woman over 50. Too naive and idealized.And what kind of aggression it? Crimea territory which for over 200 years is Russia. And more than 200 years, there are Russian troops. Most of the people there, all these 200 years were Russian. When it is in a part of Ukraine, all the past 23 years, they are perceived as a misunderstanding.Therefore, after the illegal political coup organized by U.S. taxpayers' money in order to bring to power a pro-American government, people are simply people in the Crimea did not recognize him and declared independence. Whether they supported Russia? Yes. As well as the United States in a similar situation would have supported.And funny to remember about the fact that the referendum is not unconstitutional government which came to power through unconstitutional. Constitution or valid or not. No middle ground. At the time of the referendum, the constitution has already been deposed.

Halappa
July 14th, 2014
5:07 AM
The only aggressors in the modern world - NATO and USA.

Baron
July 13th, 2014
12:07 AM
Spot on, Mr. James.

Lawrence James
July 9th, 2014
10:07 AM
Alexander Woolfson’s strident bugle call for intervention in the Ukraine and the Crimea combines a misunderstanding of history with discordant echoes of music-hall Russophobia. His speculation about whether Nato could somehow have mobilised forces for dispatch to the Crimea invokes that jingo chorus of 1854: “Let’s raise a mighty cheer,/We’re going to the Crimea,/We’ll tame the Russian bear.’ Having abjectly failed to ‘tame’ the equivalent beasts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we should know better. As for the context of recent events in the Ukraine, Woolfson disregards Russia’s historic experience and misunderstands Nato’s purpose. The alliance was the product of the Cold War created solely to resist Soviet encroachments on Western Europe and not to make land grabs across the borders of the former Russian empire. Wisely, it did not take advantage of the implosion of the Communist state in the 1990s and repeat the Allied intervention during the Russian civil war of 1918 to 1920. Yet, something along the lines of this catastrophic enterprise is now being contemplated as a solution to the Ukrainian crisis by overheated champions of Nato engagement in what has always been accepted as a Russian sphere of influence. Russia has made it plain that she regards the former Czarist and Soviet province of the Ukraine as a de facto province. There are valid historic reasons for this. The French invasions of 1812 and the German of 1918 and 1940 taught Russians that their land mass was the best means of defence. Since the eighteenth century the Ukraine has been a vital part of this vast glacis. Russia is also nervously aware that on the two latter occasions a substantial number of Ukrainians defected to the invaders. Likewise, Russia has a legitimate claim to the Crimea, as strong, say, as the United States has to Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and its sundry Pacific island naval and air bases. If a section of the population of any one of these outposts chose to spurn their patrons and attach themselves to their rivals, gunboats or their modern counterparts would soon be in action. Their use would be justified by the same arguments as Russia has deployed over the Crimea. Post-Cold War geo-strategy has seen a reversion to traditional assumptions and methods. We live, as we did in 1914, in a world of official and unofficial empires and spheres of influence. This being so, there is an excellent historic case for the Ukraine staying within the orbit of Russia and the Crimea returning to Russian sovereignty. Acceptance of a status quo upheld by history is infinitely preferable to a policy of shifty intrigues with malcontent Ukrainians and sending absurdly tiny detachments of Nato soldiers to camp out in the forests and marshes of Lithuania.

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