Putin has achieved his aim of destabilising Ukraine to the point that its membership of Nato or the EU is unrealistic in the mid-term and he now controls the strategically important Crimean port of Sevastapol. Beyond these goals, and even once tensions recede, he has ushered in a new chapter in transatlantic security and it has been imposed upon, not directed by, the Nato allies. The European settlement is under threat from inside and out, and Putin has managed to drive a wedge between the European and American allies over how best to manage the situation or meet future security requirements.
It is ten years since the "big bang" of EU enlargement absorbed much of the former Soviet Union and talk of the future scope of the union seemed to defy geography. With a quick, skilful assault on the contours of European democracy and Nato's credibility, Putin has reversed the post-Cold War success of Nato and the EU in extending membership to whomever met their democratic and economic requirements. It is no coincidence that one of the few unifying issues among the extremist parties at the European polls has been their anti-American stance and pro-Putin links. The Kremlin will no doubt welcome their destabilising presence in the European parliament.
A week after his West Point speech, Obama's sop to the terrified and most at risk eastern European members of Nato was the announcement of a "European reassurance initiative" (ERI). The package sounded more impressive than his previous lacklustre efforts at European security. However, as use of the word "reassurance" rather than "deterrence" signals, Obama's real impulse was less about securing Europe and more about a short-term pacifier for America's noisy Nato partners. The reality is that extra troop rotations and naval patrols in Europe of the magnitude announced will not make a significant strategic difference to European security. Unsurprisingly, Obama's announcement made intra-Nato politics worse. The Western European allies were concerned about jeopardising business links with Moscow, while the eastern allies, the Poles in particular, complained that the efforts did not go far enough to protect them. Indeed, Poland has asked for a Nato deployment of 10,000 men on its soil.
Obama and the northern European allies seem to think the crisis will blow over and it will soon be a return to business as usual. So while the President looks to his European partners to increase their share of the burden, Nato continues to act as if the full US military is behind it. In reality, the US military is undergoing its biggest decrease in man power since the Second World War. The worrying outcome of this mutual US-European evasion of responsibility is not the loss of Franco-Russo naval contracts or German natural gas imports, which currently impede a unified European response to Russia, but that smaller eastern European Nato members will look to bolster their security through non-Nato channels. This would lead to heightened security tensions and the spread of political instability on the continent.
Russia's actions in Ukraine have seen it reject the 1997 Nato-Russia Founding Act, which formalised post-Cold War borders. Failure by America to act decisively and let an under-resourced mid-level power undertake low-cost revisionism on Nato's doorstep has not only heightened the security stakes in Europe but also set a dangerous global precedent. Coupled with Obama's stated desire for burden-sharing with regional allies, it is having undesirable and counterproductive strategic consequences.
The message has already been absorbed in Asia. Shinzo Abe's Japan has undertaken an unprecedented move from a historically limited defence force to an offer to support regional allies against China. Abe has simultaneously stoked nationalist rhetoric, prodding the Chinese dragon. The outcome of grooming nationalist-inspired regional hegemons is not hard to envisage. This is fertile ground for regional arms races, into which America would be dragged via treaty obligations. Of equal concern is that Ukraine voluntarily denuclearised on the basis that it would receive territorial guarantees from major powers. The fate of Ukraine might lead other powers in a similar position to develop a nuclear deterrent or seek alliances with alternatives to the US.
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