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Why was the figure used? One explanation put to us by a director of Vote Leave is that it was a mistake, and simply the result of shoddy research — the campaign had a very small and inexperienced research team and it came up with the wrong figure. Cummings and Elliott started to use it in their literature and were too proud to back down. When challenged about the figure the response would come: “That train has left the station.”

Another explanation — unsurprisingly preferred by Elliott and Cummings — is that the figure was deliberately picked by them because it was defendable but less than robust. By chucking a dodgy number into the mix, the figure was endlessly debated. It would lead news bulletins and be repeated ad nauseam. The figure would stick in the public’s minds. The Remainers would have to come out with their own figure, which would also sound very large to voters. Saying we only send £190 million per week to Brussels is not a good starting point if you are defending the UK’s EU membership.

Elliott had pulled off the same trick in 2011 when he ran the successful No to AV campaign. He attached a rather dubious figure to the cost of changing the electoral system and asked voters if they wouldn’t rather spend the money on nurses. The figure was challenged and debated. Even though extremely trivial in terms of government expenditure, it stuck in people’s minds. Whether a cock-up or a stroke of genius, £350 million certainly worked on the ground. Campaigners have told us it was frequently repeated back to them on the doorstep and at street stalls, unprompted. One Vote Leave insider told us he found the use of £350 million, and its effectiveness, deeply unsettling. The lesson, he said, is that in politics it pays to lie.


Myth No. 5: Vote Leave ran the most sophisticated data-led campaign in British electoral history

“The Vote Leave campaign, led by Matthew Elliott and Dominic Cummings was, with its 17,410,742 votes, the most successful political campaign in British history.”

Or so argued Tim Montgomerie in The Times. In one sense this is true — more people voted for Brexit than have ever voted for anything else in the UK. In another sense it is the purest piffle. By Montgomerie’s logic, Stronger In was the second most successful campaign in British history.

With some justice, the referendum was described as the most important vote that the electorate would cast in their lifetimes; it was much more significant than the result of any single general election. Yet the ground war on both sides was woeful compared to even the worst-run general election campaign for a major party.

In the ground war of a general election, parties canvass voters not to persuade them to change their minds (obviously if someone does so, it’s a bonus) but to find out who their supporters are, and then to make sure they vote, be it by arranging postal ballots or by encouraging them to turn out on the day. Canvassing enables the major parties to build up a picture of their supporters over a number of elections.

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Lawrence JamesAnonymousL
August 29th, 2016
10:08 AM
Why no reference to the tales of the swarms of libidinous, scimitar brandishing Turks poised to sweep towards Britain ? Perhaps the Bashi-Bazouks were deterred by the rumour of the European army mustering and, in some versions, ready to crush anti-Eu dissidents here and on the continent. Uhlans did not appear in Upminster, but the possibility added to the rumours.

Alan Cochrane
August 26th, 2016
12:08 PM
In this otherwise illuminating debunking of what they call the EU referendum myths, I am very much afraid that their conclusion that Project Fear didn’t work in the Scottish referendum and so shouldn’t have been tried in the EU version, shows that Michael Mosbacher and Oliver Wiseman have misread the lessons from north of the border. The plain fact is that the rubbishing of the nationalists’ economic plans, which given the subsequent collapse in the oil price and the concomitant £15 billion ‘black hole’ in the Scottish economy now looks extremely mild. The over optimistic miscalculation of Scotland’s future was reckless in the extreme and could not have been left unchallenged by the No camp. The fact that it was stupidly dubbed ‘Project Fear’ by an apparatchik in the Unionist camp detracts from its efficacy only in respect of the bad press it subsequently attracted. Complaints about it stemmed both from émigré Scots in London who wanted more passion – and in one case more music – in the anti-Nat battle and from English Tory politicians who didn’t understand what was going on in Scotland but thought they knew better anyway. But the plain fact is that the constant attacks on the nationalists’ pie-in-the-sky, back of a fag packet projections, orchestrated in the main by Alistair, now Lord, Darling, worked and worked extremely well. The nationalists’ main gripe as regards the entire operation mounted against them appears to centre on the fact that Darling, Chancellor Osborne and Governor Carney, as well as the leaders and finance spokesmen for all the Unionist parties said in words of one syllable that an independent Scotland could not retain the pound. ‘But it’s as much Scotland’s pound as anyone else’s’ complained Alex Salmond, ‘ so why can’t we use it?’ Unfortunately for his cause, the political leaders in Wales and Northern Ireland, whose peoples also share sterling, were stern in their lack of support for their fellow Celt. Thus was this and every claim of the Nats – Project Fib as some came to call their promises of an economic nirvana – ruthlessly denounced and dismissed, yet Mosbacher and Wiseman suggest that Project Fear was actually responsible for increasing the pro-independence as the campaign progressed. It is true that the opinion polls narrowed but Darling, for one, always insisted that the final result would be closer than the early opinion polls suggested. If we are looking for myths to debunk, may I suggest that the biggest of all in relation to the Scottish referendum is that the result hinged on the extra powers promised for the Scottish Parliament by all the Unionist politicians. This massive extension of Holyrood’s responsibilities, rushed through in what can only be described as hopelessly indecent haste, by Lord Smith’s Commission was a panic measure, pure and simple. And a panic measure that wasn’t needed. Opinion poll evidence suggests pretty conclusively that it was Alex Salmond’s lack of a credible economic policy that did for him, not promises of extra powers: or in other words - It was Project Fear wot won it. Still, I digress. Living in Scotland and voting for Remain, like the bulk of my compatriots, my knowledge of the how Brexit won in England is sketchy. However, whilst the Brexiteers shamelessly tried to terrify the horses with their ludicrous ‘£350 million for the NHS’ claim, I think Mosbacher and Wiseman got it right when they said that by keeping shtum about their economic plans the Leavers didn’t allow the kind of detailed examination to which Project Fear subjected poor old Alex Salmond’s. Why the Remain camp did not concentrate on exposing that glaring omission in the Brexit case is something only its leaders can explain. Alan Cochrane Edinburgh

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