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This raised a fundamental question: if a state can revive in this manner, did it ever actually fail? The key question with regard to the past 300 years of Poland's history is therefore: why was it not a viable state in 1708 (or indeed in 1988) if it could be a viable one in 2008? The answer was that it was not so much Poland as the international environment and therefore the conditions governing the life of states which had altered, and altered fundamentally.

When I was writing my book in the 1980s, the states deemed successful were those, such as Russia and Prussia, that had shown themselves capable of mobilising their resources into building up a developed and powerful state and playing a significant role on the international scene. Yet, as anyone who has read Christopher Clark's brilliant book Iron Kingdom will agree, the story of Prussia is that of an ambitious dynasty caught in a 300-year-long struggle for survival through dominion that came to grief in 1918, leaving a toxic legacy that would poison the world for much of the 20th century. Russia's history is hardly less unhappy - it is a story of largely pointless expansion unattended by any contingent benefit, which fell apart in the most humiliating manner in 1989. Both ventures inflicted human suffering on an unprecedented scale, on their own people as well as on their neighbours. It is now clear that in the long term those countries, such as Italy and Poland, traditionally dismissed as
basket-cases, have been far more successful than either.

This only really became apparent after 1989. Over the past 300 years, modern Europe's emerging states were caught in a self-perpetuating Darwinian struggle for survival through armed competition and expansion, culminating in the First World War. Although the horrors of that and of the Second World War convinced most Western societies to seek another means of coexistence, Russia remained married to the old model. That meant the rest of the world had to remain on its guard. The end of the Cold War has removed that necessity. And that has changed everything.

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Kilroy
October 18th, 2009
1:10 PM
It is heartening to see the West taking notice of a part of the world that, as Zamoyski illustrates, it can learn a great deal from today. However, I must disagree with his concluding remarks about the reasons for Polish resilience throughout her history: By claiming that it was the “European Christian humanist civilization, with its fruits of democracy, civil liberty and all the rest” Zamoyski seems to impute a post-modern universalist attitude that simply did not (and could not) exist among the agents of Polish nationalist resistance and struggle, whether it was during the years of Partition under the Central European empires, or Nazi and later Soviet occupation. Many of the factions that provided the institutional framework for resistance were hardly democratic or concerned with civil liberty the way we would understand it today (e.g. the “Endeks”). Of course it is true that the average Pole loved his freedom, and in this respect, he shared much in common with the American Revolutionaries of the 18th century; however, the love of the liberal institutions that moderns associate with liberty were always set in the context of Polish national survival, and accordingly, indigenous nationalist sentiment. This sentiment translated in times of oppression as an indomitable stubbornness on part of a defeated but unforgiving populace. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to hold that “what preserved the Poles in the face of immeasurably superior odds and unspeakably ghastly ordeals were those very values” of “humanist civilization ... and all the rest”. What follows is the grave error in presuming that these values are indeed a “very powerful weapon”. On the contrary: the term “Finlandisation” has recently become synonymous with the status of a country seemingly sovereign, but almost completely dominated by a neighbour and forced into the delusion of “soft power” as an effective vehicle for international engagement. Contrary to Zamoyski’s thesis, the Poles themselves have not fallen for this delusion: this is one of the many reasons why they too remain partly married to the old model by their involvement of the (now cancelled) Missile Shield. The history of Central Europe is highly complex. Zamoyski does a great service to both Poland and the West by addressing it and presenting it to a Western audience. But he must resist the common mistake of contemporary historians to take a reductionist view of cause and effect. Many have made this error and it would be a pity if Zamoyski were to follow them.

Daniel
August 29th, 2009
8:08 PM
Zamoyski's history of Poland is a fantastic achievement. As a student of Central and Eastern European Studies I highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand the region. The facts are clear and the opinions balanced. The Rzeczpospolita has many lessons for our modern democracy.

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