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Until the end of the 18th century, war was an extremely effective vehicle for the conduct of policy, and victory brought enormous gains, politically and economically-one only has to consider the rise of Prussia under Frederick the Great or Great Britain's country's fabulous harvest in terms of wealth and dominion from the Seven Years' War. That became less and less true as the 19th century progressed, and looking back over the past 100 years it is not easy to point to many wars that have brought the victor much in terms of economic or political benefit. Recently, even successful military operations have produced profoundly negative effects, such as a huge political deficit at home and condemnation abroad, not to mention an increased exposure to terrorism, as both the US and Israel have learnt to their cost. Conventional war is also becoming increasingly difficult to wage, since every state in the world is economically connected at some level, and even the most dictatorial absolutist regimes find it more and more difficult to inspire or force their people to fight. Russia's invasion of Georgia last year cost her tens of billions in terms of foreign investment, even if it did bring Putin and Medvedev a political bonus at home. Her attempt to use gas as an economic weapon is also ultimately doomed to failure, since treating customers as enemies will inevitably drive them away. Also, invading Eastern Europe would only enslave a large number of her customers, thereby making them unable to pay, which would be counter-productive. However impractical and therefore unlikely conventional war might be, this does not mean we should disarm and repeat the mistake made by the Poles in the 16th and 17th centuries. There are still plenty of states out there bent on aggression - one only has to think of Russia, China and Iran. The real question facing us now is to find the weapons with which to defend ourselves.

History throws up more questions than answers. But one lesson to be learnt from the past couple of centuries is surely that European Christian humanist civilisation, with its fruits of democracy, civil liberty and all the rest, is in itself a very powerful weapon. Whether one agrees with the late Samuel Huntington's vision of a clash of civilisations or not, it cannot be denied that what preserved the Poles in the face of immeasurably superior odds and unspeakably ghastly ordeals were those very values. And sometimes it is necessary to lose a battle or two in order to win a war.

Although I had to take the best part of a year rewriting a book I had hoped to buff up in a matter of weeks, I found the work curiously comforting, as it confirmed me in my conviction that soft values triumph and that faith in human dignity does win out in the end. In our search for security we must never forget this. As President Obama said on his first day in office, the choice between safety and ideals is a false one.

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Kilroy
October 18th, 2009
1:10 PM
It is heartening to see the West taking notice of a part of the world that, as Zamoyski illustrates, it can learn a great deal from today. However, I must disagree with his concluding remarks about the reasons for Polish resilience throughout her history: By claiming that it was the “European Christian humanist civilization, with its fruits of democracy, civil liberty and all the rest” Zamoyski seems to impute a post-modern universalist attitude that simply did not (and could not) exist among the agents of Polish nationalist resistance and struggle, whether it was during the years of Partition under the Central European empires, or Nazi and later Soviet occupation. Many of the factions that provided the institutional framework for resistance were hardly democratic or concerned with civil liberty the way we would understand it today (e.g. the “Endeks”). Of course it is true that the average Pole loved his freedom, and in this respect, he shared much in common with the American Revolutionaries of the 18th century; however, the love of the liberal institutions that moderns associate with liberty were always set in the context of Polish national survival, and accordingly, indigenous nationalist sentiment. This sentiment translated in times of oppression as an indomitable stubbornness on part of a defeated but unforgiving populace. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to hold that “what preserved the Poles in the face of immeasurably superior odds and unspeakably ghastly ordeals were those very values” of “humanist civilization ... and all the rest”. What follows is the grave error in presuming that these values are indeed a “very powerful weapon”. On the contrary: the term “Finlandisation” has recently become synonymous with the status of a country seemingly sovereign, but almost completely dominated by a neighbour and forced into the delusion of “soft power” as an effective vehicle for international engagement. Contrary to Zamoyski’s thesis, the Poles themselves have not fallen for this delusion: this is one of the many reasons why they too remain partly married to the old model by their involvement of the (now cancelled) Missile Shield. The history of Central Europe is highly complex. Zamoyski does a great service to both Poland and the West by addressing it and presenting it to a Western audience. But he must resist the common mistake of contemporary historians to take a reductionist view of cause and effect. Many have made this error and it would be a pity if Zamoyski were to follow them.

Daniel
August 29th, 2009
8:08 PM
Zamoyski's history of Poland is a fantastic achievement. As a student of Central and Eastern European Studies I highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand the region. The facts are clear and the opinions balanced. The Rzeczpospolita has many lessons for our modern democracy.

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