You are here:   Communism > How I Rewrote Polish History
 

The Poles' conviction that strong central government was a threat to civil liberties went hand in hand with a real phobia on the subject of a standing army. They maintained that both were in any case largely unnecessary. Local assemblies were quite capable of electing magistrates and officers and raising the necessary funds. The absence of an army meant that Poland threatened no one, and therefore, they argued, did not invite attack, while the necessity of having to deal with a levée en masse discouraged it.

Too late, in the mid-18th century, Polish society woke up to the fact that having no effective central government and no army rendered it defenceless against its absolutist neighbours. It embarked on a hurried attempt to turn the Commonwealth into a modern state that could hold its own, but time ran out and it was set upon and divided up by its three neighbours, Russia, Prussia and Austria.

Victory against totalitarianism seemed a long way off, if at all likely, in the early 1980s. I was therefore writing the history of an enterprise that had foundered. While many a more successful state would have gone under if faced by the combined onslaught of three such powerful neighbours, and later of the unspeakable forces of German fascism and Russian communism, the whole of the country's history nevertheless seemed deeply tainted by this ultimate failure. I dwelt at some length on the cultural aspects of that history, since it was virtually unknown in this country, and pointed to positive achievements, but at the time I had an uneasy feeling that in doing so I was somehow indulging in special pleading.

Rereading the book prior to revising and updating it was a curious experience, and I soon realised that the whole thing would have to be rewritten from scratch. Poland was up and running once more. It could not compare, in terms of institutional and structural solidity or economic power with other European states of a similar size, but it rated highly in terms of social cohesion and showed every sign of being able to narrow the gap. What was more, this former Russian satrapy was now indisputably a player on the international stage, and by no means an insignificant one.

View Full Article
 
Share/Save
 
 
 
 
Kilroy
October 18th, 2009
1:10 PM
It is heartening to see the West taking notice of a part of the world that, as Zamoyski illustrates, it can learn a great deal from today. However, I must disagree with his concluding remarks about the reasons for Polish resilience throughout her history: By claiming that it was the “European Christian humanist civilization, with its fruits of democracy, civil liberty and all the rest” Zamoyski seems to impute a post-modern universalist attitude that simply did not (and could not) exist among the agents of Polish nationalist resistance and struggle, whether it was during the years of Partition under the Central European empires, or Nazi and later Soviet occupation. Many of the factions that provided the institutional framework for resistance were hardly democratic or concerned with civil liberty the way we would understand it today (e.g. the “Endeks”). Of course it is true that the average Pole loved his freedom, and in this respect, he shared much in common with the American Revolutionaries of the 18th century; however, the love of the liberal institutions that moderns associate with liberty were always set in the context of Polish national survival, and accordingly, indigenous nationalist sentiment. This sentiment translated in times of oppression as an indomitable stubbornness on part of a defeated but unforgiving populace. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to hold that “what preserved the Poles in the face of immeasurably superior odds and unspeakably ghastly ordeals were those very values” of “humanist civilization ... and all the rest”. What follows is the grave error in presuming that these values are indeed a “very powerful weapon”. On the contrary: the term “Finlandisation” has recently become synonymous with the status of a country seemingly sovereign, but almost completely dominated by a neighbour and forced into the delusion of “soft power” as an effective vehicle for international engagement. Contrary to Zamoyski’s thesis, the Poles themselves have not fallen for this delusion: this is one of the many reasons why they too remain partly married to the old model by their involvement of the (now cancelled) Missile Shield. The history of Central Europe is highly complex. Zamoyski does a great service to both Poland and the West by addressing it and presenting it to a Western audience. But he must resist the common mistake of contemporary historians to take a reductionist view of cause and effect. Many have made this error and it would be a pity if Zamoyski were to follow them.

Daniel
August 29th, 2009
8:08 PM
Zamoyski's history of Poland is a fantastic achievement. As a student of Central and Eastern European Studies I highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand the region. The facts are clear and the opinions balanced. The Rzeczpospolita has many lessons for our modern democracy.

Post your comment

CAPTCHA
This question is for testing whether you are a human visitor and to prevent automated spam submissions.