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In contrast to most of the states deemed worth studying at the time, Poland, though a nation-based polity, had throughout the middle ages and early modern period shown a remarkably casual attitude to the possession of its historic lands and the harnessing of its resources, human or material. It had not built up institutions of central government, created organs of control, invested in infrastructure, armed itself or taxed its citizens to any significant degree. When describing the Polish state in the 18th century, foreign observers would use the word "anarchy", in its original sense of absence of government.

The Poles themselves were proud of this state of affairs. Polska nierz dem stoi (Poland's strength lies in the absence of government) was a rallying-cry of the political majority. From the early middle ages, the Poles had shown marked distaste for all authority, particularly if it was concentrated in few hands. And although there was a strong sense of a Polish world in existence (in contrast to the German and Bohemian ones), a lack of obvious natural frontiers which might define it and the fact that it was inhabited by various ethnic groups and welcomed newcomers such as Jews, Armenians and Tatars militated against successive kings' efforts to consolidate it. By the end of the middle ages, the Polish gentry had established robust parliamentary institutions as a check on royal power and enjoyed greater personal liberty than any other group of people in Europe, as well as the lowest rate of taxation. They called their country "the Commonwealth" and regarded it as their common property.

Their suspicion of strong central government intensified by reaction to what was going on beyond their borders. To the east, the unfettered power of Ivan the Terrible provided chilling evidence of the human cost involved in the creation of a strong Muscovite state. To the north and west they could see the political class and the representative bodies of Sweden, Brandenburg and Prussia being gradually emasculated and abolished. And while the Poles agreed to differ on religious matters, in virtually every other part of Europe the absolute rule of monarchs transformed the Reformation and Counter-Reformation into a bloodbath.

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Kilroy
October 18th, 2009
1:10 PM
It is heartening to see the West taking notice of a part of the world that, as Zamoyski illustrates, it can learn a great deal from today. However, I must disagree with his concluding remarks about the reasons for Polish resilience throughout her history: By claiming that it was the “European Christian humanist civilization, with its fruits of democracy, civil liberty and all the rest” Zamoyski seems to impute a post-modern universalist attitude that simply did not (and could not) exist among the agents of Polish nationalist resistance and struggle, whether it was during the years of Partition under the Central European empires, or Nazi and later Soviet occupation. Many of the factions that provided the institutional framework for resistance were hardly democratic or concerned with civil liberty the way we would understand it today (e.g. the “Endeks”). Of course it is true that the average Pole loved his freedom, and in this respect, he shared much in common with the American Revolutionaries of the 18th century; however, the love of the liberal institutions that moderns associate with liberty were always set in the context of Polish national survival, and accordingly, indigenous nationalist sentiment. This sentiment translated in times of oppression as an indomitable stubbornness on part of a defeated but unforgiving populace. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading to hold that “what preserved the Poles in the face of immeasurably superior odds and unspeakably ghastly ordeals were those very values” of “humanist civilization ... and all the rest”. What follows is the grave error in presuming that these values are indeed a “very powerful weapon”. On the contrary: the term “Finlandisation” has recently become synonymous with the status of a country seemingly sovereign, but almost completely dominated by a neighbour and forced into the delusion of “soft power” as an effective vehicle for international engagement. Contrary to Zamoyski’s thesis, the Poles themselves have not fallen for this delusion: this is one of the many reasons why they too remain partly married to the old model by their involvement of the (now cancelled) Missile Shield. The history of Central Europe is highly complex. Zamoyski does a great service to both Poland and the West by addressing it and presenting it to a Western audience. But he must resist the common mistake of contemporary historians to take a reductionist view of cause and effect. Many have made this error and it would be a pity if Zamoyski were to follow them.

Daniel
August 29th, 2009
8:08 PM
Zamoyski's history of Poland is a fantastic achievement. As a student of Central and Eastern European Studies I highly recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand the region. The facts are clear and the opinions balanced. The Rzeczpospolita has many lessons for our modern democracy.

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